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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study analyses the possible costs and benefits of the enlargement of the 
European Union towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, thus the break up of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon as well as 
the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of a historical era in Europe. From then on, 
Europe is no longer divided into two poles in terms of ideological differences. With 
this historical change in the political and ideological structure, there appears an 
opportunity to establish a new European order. This thesis argues that enlargement of 
the European Union towards the east seems to be a step towards creating security and 
stability beyond the present borders of Europe. Each enlargement changes the size, 
geography, composition, scope, and direction of the Union. As has been seen from the 
previous enlargement processes, the EU acts as a magnet for surrounding states, many 
of whom have determined that the benefits of membership exceed the costs of non-
membership. Since the EU decides which applicant states join, and under what 
conditions, it has enormous influence over the fates of nations. This study argues that 
the coming enlargement seems to be “historically unique” and probably the “largest 
challenge”, which the Union has ever faced. Therefore, the possible opportunities of 
enlargement also carry some risks as well as political challenges. A complete 
integration of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe with the European Union 
will probably be another momentous process in those countries’ history after their 
withdrawal from the Soviet sphere of influence. 
iv
ÖZET
Bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği’nin Orta ve Doğu Avrupa’ya yönelik genişleme
sürecinin olası getirilerini ve zararlarını incelemektedir. Sovyetler Birliği’nin
çözülmesi, dolayısıyla Varşova Paktı’nın ve Komekon’un parçalanması ve aynı
zamanda Berlin Duvarı’nın yıkılması Avrupa’da tarihi bir dönemin sonunu
getirmiştir. Bu andan itibaren Avrupa artık ideolojik farklılıklar yüzünden iki kutuba
ayrılmamaktadır. Politik ve ideolojik yapıdaki bu tarihsel değişimle yeni bir Avrupa
düzeni kurma fırsatı belirmiştir. Bu tez, Avrupa Birliği’nin doğuya genişlemesinin
Avrupa’nın halihazırdaki sınırlarının ötesinde güvenlik ve düzen yaratmak amacıyla
atılmış bir adım olduğunu savunmaktadır. Her genişleme Birliğin hacmini,
coğrafyasını, bileşimini, faaliyet alanını, yönünü değiştirmektedir. Daha önceki
genişleme süreçlerinde de görüldüğü üzere Avrupa Birliği kendisini çevreleyen
ülkeler için bir mıknatıs görevi görmekte ve bu ülkelerin birçoğu üyeliğin faydalarının
üye olmamanın maliyetini geçtiğine inanmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği başvuruda bulunan
ülkelerden hangisinin, ne koşullarda katılabileceğine karar verdiği için, milletlerin
kaderleri üzerinde fevkalade bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu çalışma gelecek genişlemenin
Birliğin bugüne kadar karşılaştığı “tarihsel olarak tek” ve muhtemelen “büyük bir
meydan okuma” olarak göründüğünü savunmaktadır. Bu sebeple, genişlemenin olası
fırsatları aynı zamanda hem bazı riskler hem de politik meydan okumalar
taşımaktadır. Orta ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin Sovyet etkisinden çıkmasından sonra
Avrupa Birliği ile tümüyle bütünleşmesi bu ülkelerin tarihinde bir başka önemli
dönem olacaktır.
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1INTRODUCTION
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, thus the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and
Comecon as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of a historical era in
Europe. Sınce then, Europe is no longer divided into two poles in terms of ideological
differences. With this historical change in the political and ideological structure, there
appears an opportunity to establish a new European order. Therefore, enlargement of
the European Union towards the east seems to be a step towards creating security and
stability beyond the present borders of Europe.
21st century will possibly witness a new wave of enlargement of the Union,
this time towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The coming
enlargement seems to be “historically unique” and probably the “largest challenge”,
which the Union has ever faced. The possible opportunities of enlargement also carry
some risk as well as political challenges. A complete integration of the countries from
Central and Eastern Europe with the European Union will probably be another
momentous process in those countries’ history after their withdrawal from the Soviet
and later Russian, sphere of influence as well as interest.
This thesis aims to put forward a cost and benefit analysis of the eastward
enlargement of the European Union, by mainly focusing on the views of both the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the European Union as a whole.
The thesis consists of four chapters:
2The first chapter focuses on the historical evolution of the Union, which dated
back to 1950s. Furthermore, it includes the previous processes of enlargement that the
Union faced.
The second chapter deals with the coming – the fifth – enlargement of the
Union in detail. It further analyses the enlargement process, which the candidate
countries experienced and are still experiencing. Furthermore, it deeply analyses the
ten applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe in terms of both political and
economical criteria.
The third chapter makes a cost and benefit analysis of the coming enlargement
by mainly focusing on the views of both the applicant countries and the European
Union as a whole.
The fourth chapter makes an overall analysis of European Union’s
enlargement towards Central and Eastern European countries. It focuses on Member
States’ perspective on the issue of “deepening and widening”. Moreover, it asserts a
conclusion on the importance of EU’s Central and Eastern European expansion.
3CHAPTER I
HISTORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT
1.1 Milestones In EU History - From EC to EU
The organisation known, since ratification of the Maastricht Treaty1 on
November 1, 1993 as the European Union, began its life as the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950. Jean Monnet suggested to the French Foreign
Minister, Robert Schuman, and the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, that a
community of interest be established between their countries, in the shape of a jointly
managed market in coal and steel under the control of an independent authority. The
proposal was officially tabled by France on 9 May 19502. The institution came into
being on April 18, 1951, when Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Paris and agreed to accept a common
authority to regulate the production of coal and steel. The United Kingdom was
invited to join but refused, rejecting the idea of relinquishing its right of decision on
                                                          
1 In December 1991, the European Union (EU) established the Maastricht Treaty, which offers the EU
an opportunity to become a political and economic world superpower. The treaty provides for a single
European currency, common citizenship, common foreign and security policy, a more effective
European Parliament, and a common labour policy. Each of these goals presents some challenges for
the countries involved, such as setting a new monetary policy. As all 12 EU countries have approved
and/or ratified the treaty, its monetary policies have been set in action. However, the sovereignty
movement within the nation states may become an obstacle to the success of the Maastricht treaty, and
future ratifications of the treaty are not very likely.
2 http://europa.eu.int
4British mines and steelworks. The ECSC came into being as planned in February
1952, which immediately proved a marked success in economic terms. Furthermore,
the establishment of the community marked the beginning of peaceful European
cooperation. This comprehensive economic integration of the coal and steel
industries was intended to lead eventually to a political union3.
The initiative to move on from the ECSC to what was known, between 1958
and 1967 as the European Economic Community (EEC), and from 1967 to 1991 as
the European Communities (EEC, Euratom and the ECSC) was taken by Belgium,
Holland and Luxembourg4. In 25 March 1957 the two Treaties of Rome (Euratom
and EEC) were signed and came into effect in 1 January 1958. The European
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty committed the Six to the creation of a common
market to allow the free movement of persons, services and capital; and to the
harmonisation of their economic policies. Also the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) to support farmers was established. The EEC Treaty set up institutions and
decision-making mechanisms through which both national interests and a
Community view could find their expression. From that time onwards, the EC was
the major axis around which the movement for a united Europe turned5. The Euratom
Treaty, meanwhile, was meant to be a new impetus for European cooperation and
was set up to promote nuclear energy which aimed at creating a common market for
atomic energy, but Euratom remained a very junior actor and focused primarily on
research6.
                                                          
3 http://europa.eu.int
4 Kiander Baldwin, Expanding Membership of the European Union (New York: Cambridge
University Press 1995), 21
5 Leon Hurwitz, The State Of The European Community (Harlow: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991),
403.
6 Kiander Baldwin, Expanding Membership of the European Union, 24.
5The Merger Treaty of April 8, 1965, which came into force on July 1, 1967,
established a single executive for the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom. The term
European Community describes the coming together of the institutions of these three
organisations. Another notable development took place in 1987 with the coming into
force of the Single European Act, which set out the timetable for the creation of the
Single Market by 1993. This brought about the world's largest trading area of 370
million people and the free movement of goods, capital, people and services.
On February 7, 1992, the Treaty on European Union, which was known as
the Maastricht Treaty, was signed. This treaty is seen as the most comprehensive
reform of the Treaties of Rome. The treaty came into force in November 1993,
almost a year later than planned. The term “European Union” was introduced by this
treaty, which established new areas of European cooperation in foreign and security
policy, justice and home affairs. It also set out the timetable for economic and
monetary union (EMU) and the introduction of a single currency7. Twelve countries
have adopted the euro, the new European currency. Euro notes and coins were
introduced in 2002. Three EU countries, namely Denmark, Sweden and the UK,
remained outside the euro-zone. Further changes were introduced by the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1999: in particular, the powers of the European Parliament were given
a major boost and increased cooperation in foreign policy and home affairs were
established.
                                                          
7 Paul Taylor, The European Union in the 1990s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 53
61.2 The Membership Criteria and Accession Procedures
In order to be acceptable as a member, the applicant countries have to fulfil a
number of criteria. Only one of the membership criteria was laid down in the Treaty
of Rome, which stated that the new member should be “European”. Article 237 of
the Treaty indicates the membership criterion as “any European nation can apply”8.
Other criteria evolved during the course of the first EU enlargement, which notably
requires the need to be a democracy, to respect human rights and to adopt the acquis
communautaire9. The latter refers to all the existing rules, regulations and
agreements of the EU, which implies that a new member cannot attempt to unravel
existing EU laws. In the early 1990s, the European Council extended the criteria
further to include a “functioning and competitive market economy… [and] an
adequate legal and administrative system in the public and private sector”10. In
addition, new members are required to subscribe to the emerging acquis politique,
that is, the developing common foreign and defence policy, and to the finalité
politique 11, which is the long-term objective of European Union.
 The formal procedure for joining the EU begins with an application being
made to the Council of Ministers. The Council may then reject the application or
                                                          
8 Stuart Croft, The Enlargement of Europe (New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 62
9 The entire body of European laws is known as the acquis communautaire, which includes all the
treaties, regulations and directives passed by the European institutions as well as judgements laid
down by the Court of Justice.
10 At the EU summit meeting in Copenhagen in 1993, the heads of state and government agreed upon
the conditions that should apply to prospective EU states. These Copenhagen Criteria call for
applicant countries to fulfil certain basic conditions to join the Union. Politically, the country must
have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of
minorities. In economic terms, the country must have a functioning market economy and the capacity
to handle competitive pressure on the Union's internal market.
11 Finalite politique is the goal of political unification set out in the Maastricht Treaty as the ultimate
objectives of the Union.
7request an opinion from the Commission12. If the opinion is positive then the Council
has to agree unanimously to proceed, for which the approval of the European
Parliament is also required. Negotiations take place between the government of the
applicant state and the Council assisted by the Commission13.
Although the EU negotiates with individual applicants rather than groups, it
does tend to group countries, since it finds it difficult to offer different terms to two
or more countries joining at the same time. What is given to one applicant sets a
precedent for what can be offered to others14. The accession procedure is thus long
and drawn out with ample scope for difficulties to arise and for individual member
states and EU institutions to delay or even sabotage the process. Accordingly, the
actual time that each stage and, consequently, the whole process takes is variable and
is determined by the enthusiasm within the EU for the applicant country in question
and the extent of the problems raised by the application15. The treaty of accession
that emerges then for each prospective member by the conclusion of the negotiations
has to be ratified in the European Parliament and the parliaments of the EU member
states and that of the applicant state.
 The European Union is a unique venture with no model in history and is
open to any European country which wants to join it and is prepared to take on all the
commitments made in the founding treaties and to subscribe to the same fundamental
objectives. When the first steps were taken towards EU cooperation in the 1950s,
                                                          
12 The Commission’s opinion can be positive, in which the negotiations may start, or negative, in
which the application is rejected, or conditional, in which EU indicates the changes the applicant
country has to make.
13 Stuart Croft, The Enlargement of Europe, 60.
14 ibid., p.61.
15 The period from making a formal application to actually joining has ranged from two years and
eight months, in the case of Finland, to eight years and ten months, in the case of Portugal.
8there were six Member States. Since then, as the results of several rounds on
enlargement, the number of member states has risen to fifteen. The EU has now
embarked on serious discussions on the accession of Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia in the first stage and Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Slovakia in a later phase16. There are some important lessons that can
be learned from EU's history and from the past enlargements. All previous four
rounds of enlargement have contributed to the formation of the procedures, basic
principles and criteria on which EU's policy of future enlargements depend on.
Therefore, examining the nature of past EU enlargements are extremely important to
understand the essence of the prospective EU enlargements.
1.3 The First Enlargement
The first EU enlargement took place on 1 January 1973, in which Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom became members of the Community. This may also
be regarded as the first European Free Trade Association (EFTA) enlargement, since
all the joining countries except Ireland were members of the European Free Trade
Association. . Norway along with UK, Ireland and Denmark signed an accession
treaty in January 1972 to the EC.  However Norwegian membership to the EC was
rejected by Norwegian people through a referendum.
                                                          
16 Neil Macfarlane, "The Regionalization of European Foreign and Security Policies," International
Journal Winter (1998-99) 13.
91.3.1 The United Kingdom
Britain was the most obvious absentee from the early attempts to integrate
Europe. In 1957 Britain decided to pursue the idea of a wider but looser free trade
area based on the OEEC states, but preparations for the EEC had gone too far, and
then in 1960 the OEEC evolved into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)17.
When, in 1957, Prime Minister Harold MacMillan justified Great Britain's
refusal to join the EEC, he described it as "a high-tariff group in Europe, inward
looking and self-sufficient"18. It was this attitude coupled with reservations about the
kind of institutions established for its own governance by the EEC, which lay behind
the British creation of the EFTA by the signature on January 4, 1960 of the
Stockholm Convention19. This grouped Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden and Switzerland in partnership with the United Kingdom, a country whose
size alone would ensure it a dominant position.
In the course of the 1950s, however, the poor performance of the British
economy had already led these reservations to be put aside and replaced by more
mundane considerations. It soon became clear to Britain that political influence in
Europe lay not with EFTA but with the EEC and that Britain would risk political
isolation if it stayed out of the EEC. On 27 July 1961, Harold Macmillan's
                                                          
17 John McCormick, Understanding the European Union (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 70-71.
18 Richard McAllister, From EC to EU (New York: Routledge, 1997), 28.
19 A looser inter-governmental body whose goal was free trade rather than economic and political
integration and involved no institutions beyond a Council of Ministers that met two or three times a
year and a group of permanent representatives serviced by a small secretariat in Geneva.
10
Conservative government applied for EEC membership. Negotiations between
Britain and the EEC opened in early 1962, which appeared to be on the verge of a
successful conclusion. However, the return to power of General de Gaulle in the
summer of 1958 prevented Britain’s accession to the EEC, since on January 14,
1963, de Gaulle vetoed the United Kingdom's application to join the EEC. De
Gaulle's veto also had the effect of preventing Denmark and the Republic of Ireland,
which had applied at the same time as the United Kingdom, from joining the EEC
since Britain's application was part of a joint package with Denmark and Ireland.
De Gaulle repeated his veto on British entry on November 27, 1967, when the
Labour government of Harold Wilson, which had replaced the Conservatives in
1964, reapplied for membership. Also together with Britain, Ireland, Norway and
Denmark had reapplied for membership.
Changed political circumstances in the course of 1969-70 facilitated a third
successful British application to join the Common Market. Most importantly, de
Gaulle resigned in April 1969. On June 15, 1969, George Pompidou was elected as
the second President of the Fifth French Republic20. Negotiations reached a
                                                          
20Richard McAllister, From EC to EU: a historical and political survey 45
11
successful enough conclusions and that Great Britain became a member of the EC on
January 1, 1973. Denmark and the Republic of Ireland, which had linked their
applications to that of Great Britain in 1961, and consequently suffered the same
rebuff in January 1963 and November 1967, became members of the EC at the same
time21.
By Great Britain’s accession to the EEC, the British had to give up the
ambition of torpedoing the EEC, which had been their obvious intention in forming
EFTA in January 1960. By accepting the Treaty of Rome in its entirety, including the
further arrangements made by its six original members since 1958, the United
Kingdom accepted that the movement towards a united Europe would take the form
of a customs union and not simply that of a free-trade area22.
1.3.2 Ireland
Britain’s relation with the EC also played the most important role in shaping
Ireland’s policy towards European integration. Until 1973, its history, its location,
and its economic dependence upon the United Kingdom made it impossible for
Ireland to join the Community. Despite following closely Britain's EEC policy, one
                                                                                                                                                                    
21 John McCormick, Understanding the European Union,76
22 Robert Bideleux, European Integration and Disintegration (Routledge, 1996), 68
12
of the prominent pro-EEC arguments was that membership would serve to weaken
Ireland's strong UK orientation in trade, loosen the ties apparently binding the two
countries in a special relationship and provide Ireland wider options23.
Within Ireland, the real watershed in attitudes occurred in the period 1958-61.
Until then, it had been outside the mainstream of European politics, having been non-
belligerent in the Second World War. In the late 1950s, a change began in Irish
politics, and Ireland made its first application to join the EC, alongside the UK, in
1961. At this time, three quarters of its exports went to Britain and half of its imports
came from the same place, making it imperative that Ireland should not remain
outside any initiatives that would endanger its commercial relations with Britain. De
Gaulle's veto of Britain in January 1963, of course, prevented Ireland's accession to
the EC.  The second application in 1967 along with Britain, of course, gave the same
result to Ireland and once again accession to the EC was turned down by De Gaulle’s
veto. When the climate for Britain changed, it changed for Ireland too. After the
Hague Summit of 1969, negotiations for Ireland opened in 1970.
On 10 May 1972 the Irish people voted 83 per cent to 17 per cent in favour of
membership. There were a number of key arguments for the membership of Ireland:
if they did not join the Community, they would probably jeopardise trade with
Britain; membership would free them from the suffocating relationship with Britain.
Since membership in January 1973, Ireland has benefited significantly from the CAP
and other transfers.
                                                          
23 David Arter, The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century 168.
13
1.3.3 Denmark
Denmark joined the Community in January 1973 together with Britain and
Ireland following a referendum in which 63 per cent of the votes being in favour to
37 per cent. The chief motivation for the “yes” vote was primarily economic,
especially for the expected benefits to Danish agriculture from CAP, while the main
reason for the “no” vote being political: the fear of reduced national sovereignty24.
Denmark was a founder member of the OEEC and the Council of Europe;
and was generally sympathetic to the British position. It was not involved in
discussions on the ECSC, since coal and steel were of no relevance to Denmark. Of
more relevance were Nordic efforts in 1947 and 1948-49 which were seeking to
bring about a Nordic Customs Union and a Nordic Defence Union. Denmark was one
of those states that took the initiative in the OEEC to try to establish a free trade area
that would include the Six, but to no avail25.
In 1961, Denmark applied for EEC membership following the British
application. Given the importance of the British and the German market to them,
Denmark wished to participate in the evolution of the CAP. Their application and
negotiations were closely linked to the British and was vetoed likewise. Again in
1969, circumstances changed with the Hague Summit and the subsequent British
                                                          
24 Sir William Nicol, Understanding the European Union 436
25 Robert Bideleux, European Integration and Disintegration 95
14
application. Accession negotiations were opened in June 1970 and were
unproblematic.
Denmark joined EC because it felt it could not afford to be outside; and it was
an economic decision to join a customs union conditioned by the policies of others
and external developments. So, it was not a vote for European political integration or
federalism; however there was support for increasing the scope of integration to
include social, environmental, industrial, regional and economic trade policy.
1.3.4 Norway
Norway had been a founding member of EFTA in 1960 when the
organisation had been established as a free trade alternative to the then EEC. Norway
had submitted its first application for membership in May 1962 after the UK and
Denmark had applied in July 1961, but this was rejected with de Gaulle's veto on
British membership in January 1962. Another French veto, in July 1967, led to
proposals for closer Nordic economic cooperation which were suspended in March
1970. After the Hague Summit of December 1969, the EU reopened negotiations
with the UK, Denmark, Norway and Ireland; and finally the four accession treaties
were signed in January 197226. A new national campaign was established in August
1970 opposing membership and criticising the Rome Treaty for its free market
approach, claiming that Norwegian membership would take away political control
over the economy and would lead to social injustice.
                                                          
26 John Redmond, The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union (Ashgate Publishing Company,
1997), 148.
15
Norwegian membership was rejected by 53.5 per cent against 46.5 per cent of
those voting in a politically divisive referendum in September 1972. The referendum
result led to the fall of the Labour government. After the failure to take up full
membership to the Community27, an industrial free trade area was negotiated
between Norway and the Communities from 1 January 1973, which helped Norway
gradually deepen its relationship with the other EFTA countries. The issue of full
membership was taken off the political agenda in Norway for the rest of the 1970s
and the early 1980s. The Norwegian case showed the importance of domestic
consensus and its impact over the accession negotiations.
1.4 The Second Enlargement
After the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark on January 1,
1973 to the EC, the process of enlargement of the European Communities was
continued on January 1, 1981 by the admission of Greece, which had applied to
become a member in 1976.
In order to bind Greece more tightly to capitalist Western Europe, the
conservative government headed by Karamanlis from 1955 to 1963 applied for
associate membership of the EC in June 1959. EC reached an association agreement
– the Athens Agreement - with Greece in July 196128. The EC was seen as a
                                                          
27 John Redmond, The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union (Ashgate Publishing Company,
1997), 149.
28 Sir William Nicoll, Understanding the European Union 476
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contributer to the stability and also there were hopes of the CAP, of financing for
economic development, and the attraction of foreign investment.  According to the
Commission's view, the problems created by the fact that Greece was much poorer
than the existing member countries were in any case too great an obstacle to its
economic integration. However, the Council of Ministers took a different view. It
saw these problems as less important than the political implications of Greece's
admission. In the council's opinion, it was essential to ensure that democracy
remained the mode of government and membership of the European Communities
seemed the best way of doing this. Therefore the underlying motivation to conclude
an association agreement with Greece was primarily political and should be placed in
the context of the origins of a Mediterranean dimension in the Community’s external
relations
However, with the imposition of a military dictatorship in Greece on 21 April
1967 by the Colonels' coup, the association ran into difficulties. Responding to
initiatives by the European Parliament, the Commission decided to freeze29 the
Association Agreement. Keeping it alive at the level of its current administration was
regarded as the preferable means of exerting pressure on the military regime; it was
feared that the complete abrogation of the Agreement might lead the regime to adopt
an isolationist and protectionist stance.
With the collapse of the Greek Colonels' regime30, in July 1974 a Greek
conservative government headed by Prime Minister Karamanlis replaced the Junta.
                                                          
29  To limit its application to tariff reductions while suspending its other provisions as long as
democracy was not restored.
30 Following the Colonels’ abortive attempt to take over Cyprus and the consequent Turkish take over
of the Turk inhabited northern part of the island.
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On 17 September 1974, the Council of Ministers decided on the resumption of the
procedures for the development of the association. In 1975, Greece decided to apply
for full membership.
The Greek Government’s decision to apply for full membership emerged out
of the political realities of the period following the collapse of the military
dictatorship in July 1974, and especially out of the desire to safeguard and
consolidate Greece’s fledgling democratic institutions. On the other hand, coming at
the time of the Cyprus crisis and Greece’s military withdrawal from NATO, the
decision to apply for full membership should also be interpreted within the wider
context of Greece’s security considerations. On the question of Greco-Turkish
relations, the European Commission saw Greece’s application for membership as
upsetting the balance31, which had been the basis of Community policy towards the
two countries since the late fifties. By entering into accession negotiations with
Greece, the Community would become a party to the disputes between the two
countries32.
The accession negotiations were formally opened in Brussels on 27 July
1976. The last meeting of the Conference at the ministerial level was held in
Luxembourg on 3 April 1979, and it was concluded that the negotiations were to be
considered complete. They had lasted almost three years and were completed in
twenty-six Conference sessions at deputy level and eleven at ministerial level33.
                                                          
31 Undoubtedly, the prospect of Greek membership introduced a new disruptive dimension into the
Greko-Turkish balance, prompting the Council to declare on 24 June 1975 that the examination of
Greece’s bid for membership would not affct Community relations with Turkey.
32 Philip Thody, Europe since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2000), 210.
33 Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Greece In a Changing Europe: between European
integration and Balkan disintegration? (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 162.
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Thus, the long process that began with Greece’s application for membership in June
1975 finally came to an end, with Greece becoming the tenth member of the
European Communities on 1 January 1981.
Greece's population of just over 10 million brought the total number of
people in the European Communities up to 190 million, and this rose to 242 million
with the admission of Spain and Portugal on January 1, 1986. Here, again, there were
strong reservations by Greece. In its turn, Greece opposed the entry of Spain and
Portugal until persuaded to change its mind by the institution of the Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes in 1985, which allowed for the spending of 6,600 million
ECUs ($7 billion) over seven years, most of which went to Greece34.
1.5 The Third Enlargement
The admission of Greece in 1981, followed by that of Spain and Portugal on
January 1, 1986, meant in cultural terms that the European Communities took on a
more Mediterranean flavour. With a total population, which then rose to 321 million,
as against 242 million for the United States of America, it then became the largest
trading bloc in the capitalist world. In both Spain and Portugal there was also much
more widespread enthusiasm for membership of the European Communities than in
Greece35. In Spain, the emphasis on the idea that a future Europe might become one
of regions than of traditional nation states was particularly popular. Portugal had
                                                          
34 Panos Kazakos and P.C.Ioakimidis (eds.) Greece and EC Membership Evaluated (London: Pinter
Publishers, 1994), 91.
35 Sir William Nicoll, Understanding the European Union 484.
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been a member of the European Free Trade Association since its launch in 1960 by
the United Kingdom, and could see no reason for not following its oldest ally, Great
Britain, into the larger and more successful grouping established by the Treaty of
Rome in March 1957.
1.5.1 Spain
Spain applied for EC membership on 28 July 1977. It had been excluded
from consideration for many years because of the nature of its regime. It was also
excluded from the UN, the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, the Council of Europe and
NATO. By the mid 1960s the question of Spain's relations with the rest of Western
Europe needed to be addressed. Modernisation became the key word and, it in return
became identified with Europeanisation36. Therefore in 1962 the Spanish favoured
the idea of association with the aim of full integration into the Community, but this
was not acceptable to the Six countries of the EEC. However, 1970 saw the signature
of a preferential trade agreement, providing for free trade. The agreement formally
lapsed when it was not adjusted to take into account the enlargement of 1973, but
both parties continued to observe its major provisions.
The death of General Franco in November 1975 was the turning point for the
relations between Spain and the Community. On November 21, 1975 Franco's death
led to the surprisingly swift transition to democracy under King Juan Carlos, a
                                                          
36 Europe was seen as offering access to wider markets, especially for agriculture and sources of
investment capital. Britain’s decision to apply was important for Spain too, given the size of the UK
market for Spanish agriculture.
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transition which meant that Spain then became eligible for membership of the
European Communities. In February 1976 the first post-Franco government
announced that Spain wished to accede to the European Community. The initial
reaction from the Community was favourable, and the formal application followed
on 28 July 1977. Given the return to democracy, it might have been thought that the
negotiations would be quick, but in fact they were protracted. This was because the
Community had its own internal problems, and because of disagreements in the
negotiations over agriculture, fisheries and the reduction of tariff barriers for Spanish
industrial goods. Hence, mainly the French, Italian and subsequently Greek fears of
the economic consequences of Spanish entry and German concerns over the
budgetary implications, dragged out the negotiations from late 1979 until March
1985. The Accession Treaty signed on 12 June 1985 and accession into the
Community was in January 198637.
Within Spain there was general agreement with the decision to access to the
Community. However Spain's EC admission did indeed cause some major problems
for its existing EC members, especially for Italy, France and Greece. Spain's
accession was to increase EC territory by nearly one third, total population by 14 per
cent, cultivated area by 30 per cent, agricultural population by 25 per cent and
fishing fleet by 70 per cent. Spain then accounted for over 40 per cent of the world's
olive oil production and had Europe's most extensive vineyards. By the early 1980s
Spain's industrial and agricultural exports exceeded those of all the other
Mediterranean states put together38. The perceived threats which were to emerge by
Spain’s accession to the EC were softened by EC insistence on a ten year transition
                                                          
37 Robert Bideleux, European Integration and Disintegration 145
38 Sir William Nicoll, Understanding the European Union 485
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period for Spanish agricultural exports, seven year transition toward freedom of
movement and free trade in industrial goods, and a sixteen year transition to full
access to EC fishing grounds and the Common Fisheries Policy.
1.5.2 Portugal
Portugal formally applied for full membership of the EC in March 1977, four
months ahead of Spain. The protracted negotiations on entry terms were completed
in March 1985 and the Accession Treaties were signed in June 1985, with effect
from 1 January 1986. Portugal had no large exportable farm surpluses nor any major
industrial export capabilities. It was a net importer of food and its accession to the
EC would only increase the EC's population by 3.7 per cent, its territory by 5.5 per
cent and its GDP by 1.9 per cent. Therefore Portugal could neither threaten the
interests of any existing EC state nor make burdensome claims on the EC budget or
the CAP. It was therefore unfortunate that the negotiations with Portugal got caught
up with the much more problematic Spanish ones, delaying Portuguese entry39.
Portugal experienced a dictatorship from 1932 to 1974. During this time the
regime was profoundly nationalistic and was strongly committed to the Portuguese
African empire. It was relatively isolated, but was tolerated by European states,
although excluded from the Council of Europe it was a member of the OEEC; and
because of its strategic position, and that of the Azores, was a founder member of
NATO. Also it became a member of EFTA in 1960. However EFTA membership
                                                          
39 Robert Bideleux, European Integration and Disintegration 139
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was no sign of commitment to the European idea, but rather reflected the importance
of trade with Britain and not becoming isolated. In July 1972, along with other EFTA
members, the Community signed a special relations agreement with Portugal. This
encompassed the elimination of tariff barriers to exports from Portugal by 1977 and
some concessions on agricultural exports.
The context of Portugal's policy and opportunities completely changed with
the revolution of 25 April 1974, which ushered in the liberation of colonies after
protracted and costly colonial wars, and after a period of apparent anarchy,
democracy. Portugal applied for membership in March 1977 four months before
Spain, with negotiations beginning simultaneously in 1978. The Treaty of Accession
was signed in June 1985, Spain and Portugal becoming members of the Community
on 1 January 1986. This historic step was taken both as a consummation of Portugal's
deepening relations with EC states and as a reinforcement of Portugal's still fragile
transition to parliamentary democracy. The negotiations were very protracted and
there were difficulties on the whole question of agriculture and the perceived threat
posed to French and Italian interests. Moreover, the Portuguese application became
caught up in the greater difficulties of Spain, being intended that the two should enter
together. In the interim the Community provided Portugal with substantial pre-
accession aid from 1980 onwards40.
Membership is seen in Portugal a having been a success, contributing to rapid
change, a transformation in the state's infrastructure, and an economic growth rate
above the Community average. Moreover the British dependency was ended with the
                                                          
40 Robert Bideleux, European Integration and Disintegration 140
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subsequent rapid growth of Spanish, German and French trade not mentioning the
rise of foreign investment in Portugal.
1.6 The Fourth Enlargement
On 1 January 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of what
was now the European Union. In many ways this represented a reversal of policy for
each of them since they had previously felt unable, or had been unwilling, to
consider such membership. The 1995 enlargement marks an important watershed for
the EU. On the one hand, in practical terms, it is the last of the traditional
enlargements whereby new members are simply brought into the existing EU
framework of institutions, policies and processes. On the other hand, it is the first of
the new, post-Maastricht, enlargements, which will make significant changes in the
EU inevitable41. Therefore the 1995 enlargement marks the beginning of a crucial
phase in the evolution of the EU. At the same time the 1995 enlargement also
concludes an important stage in the evolution of EU-EFTA42 relations. This is a
pivotal relationship in Europe, of great importance to both sides, and the 1995
accession of three EFTA members brings an end to a development which began in
1984 and which has brought the two sides together.
                                                          
41 John Redmond, The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union 1.
42 EFTA is a customs union and trading block, which was established in 1960 by Austria, Denmark,
Great Britain, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. Its current members include Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Iceland joined in 1970, Finland in 1986, and Liechtenstein in
1991. This group was known through the 1960s as the “outer seven” as opposed to the “inner six
members of the European Economic Community”. It was organised largely on the initiative of Great
Britain in an attempt to solve economic problems posed by the developments of the EEC.
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1.6.1 EU - EFTA Relations
The applications for full EU membership made by Austria, Norway, Sweden
and Finland, between 1989 and 1992 mark the end of an historic division of Western
Europe into two trading blocks. While Switzerland and Iceland chose not to apply for
EU membership, the four applications in effect resolved the tension that had existed
between the EU and EFTA for over thirty years. The fourth enlargement provided
conclusive proof that the EU model of integration has proved to be better able to
meet the long-term needs of European states than the looser EFTA model. In order to
understand why these four states applied for EU membership it is important to
examine the development of EU-EFTA relations over this period.
In January 1989, Jacques Delors, the Commission President, in presenting the
Commission's program for 1989 to the European Parliament, launched the idea of a
far-reaching discussion with EFTA states on the possibility of broader cooperation.
This was the origin of the negotiations that led, on 21 October 1991, to political
agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). Formal agreement was reached
on 2 May 199243. In the agreement the three states, and other signatories, undertook
to organise themselves, in relation to the single market, in the same way as the
Community, to ensure conditions of fair competition both ways. In the EEA the four
freedoms of the Single Market were extended to the Area. The agreement was due to
come into force on 1 January 1993, but this was delayed one year by the Swiss
                                                                                                                                                                    
43 Pierre-Henri Laurent, The State of the European Union (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998): 46.
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voters, they rejected it in a referendum on 20 December 1992 and this rejection led to
Switzerland withdrawing its interest in EC membership.
If the EEA was intended as a brake on applications for membership it did not
succeed. Even before serious negotiations had started, Austria had applied for full
EC membership on 17 July 1989. This was clearly motivated by the approach of the
Single Market. Sweden applied on 1 July 1991 and Finland on 18 March 1992.
Before the EEA referendum result Switzerland had applied on 26 May 1992 and the
Norwegian parliament approved an application in November 1992.
1.6.2 Accession Negotiations
The Commission's opinions on the applications from Austria, Finland and
Sweden were positive, but started from the hypothesis that all the applicants accepted
everything in the Treaty on European Union and all the legislation the
Community/Union had already adopted. At the Lisbon European Council in June
1992, it was agreed that the EEA agreement paved the way for the opening of
negotiations with the EFTA applicants and that preparatory work could be speeded
up. The Edinburgh European Council agreed to the opening of accession
negotiations. These opened with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden on 1
February 199344.
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The accession negotiations were notable for the problem that did not
materialise as Austria, Finland and Sweden all accepted the Common Foreign and
Security Policy without looking for any relief. In addition, a distinction between the
fourth and second and third enlargements was that this group of states were not
expected to make demands on the Community budget. Issues that did cause problems
included for all the applicants the fact that, by and large, their environmental, health
and safety standards were higher than those of the EC, together with aspects of
agricultural policy, certain specialised national state monopolies, and budgetary
contributions.
The negotiations were concluded by April 1994. The real issue was whether
voters in the applicant countries would vote for membership in the referendums each
was committed to hold. Austria voted first on 12 June 1994, Austria voted "for" by
66 per cent. Finland, fearful of instability in the Russian Federation, voted positively
by 57 per cent on 16 October 1994. Sweden voted more narrowly "for" on 13
November 1994 by 52 per cent. Given that Denmark was already a member, it had
been hoped that the positive votes in Finland and Sweden effect positively the vote in
Norway, which had already voted "no" in a referendum in 1972. On 28 November
1994 the Norwegian electorate again voted "no" by 52 per cent45.
In the member states of the Union, the ratification of the Treaties of
Accession proceeded but there was a last minute problem when Spain, in December
1994, said that it would not ratify the three accession treaties if it did not receive
access, six years earlier than its accession treaty provided, to fishing waters off
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Britain and Ireland. This dispute was resolved in a compromise covering the area and
the scale of fishing efforts.
Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the European Union on 1
January 1995. The admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden produced a more even
balance between the Mediterranean countries and the countries of northern and
central Europe.
Each enlargement, which is the European Union’s most important foreign
policy power under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, changes the size, geography,
composition, scope, and direction of the Union. As has been seen from the previous
enlargements, the EU acts as a magnet for surrounding states, many of whom have
determined that the benefits of membership exceed the costs of non-membership.
Since the EU decides which applicant states join, and under what conditions, it has
enormous influence over the fates of nations.
Britain’s entry was a milestone; it represented a fundamental break with the
centuries-old pattern of Anglo-European relations, and also it rounded out the
Common Market’s membership to include all former colonial powers, overcame old
divisions dating back to the split between the old European Economic Community
and the European Free Trade Association. No less significant for the EU and its
southern neighbours was the entry of the former dictatorships of Greece, Spain, and
Portugal during the 1980s. This not only consolidated democracy in those countries
in ways not possible without the incentives of membership, but it also made the EU a
Mediterranean power in its own right. Swedish, Finnish, and Austrian accession in
28
1995 is also making a mark on EU foreign policy. The causes of democratization and
market reforms in the Baltic republics, Baltic accession to the EU, and the
environmental situation in the Baltic Sea are championed by Sweden. Finland gives
the EU a long border with Russia, and Austria deeply implicates the EU in the affairs
of Central and Eastern European countries.
Although the EU becomes more diverse and decision making becomes more
complicated with each enlargement, enlargement has made the EU an economic and
financial superpower. Each enlargement causes a metamorphosis in the EU’s
relationship with the outside world. Successive enlargements have created the
world’s largest import and export market, and the EU is now one of the world’s three
economic superpowers. New members adjust to the EU’s international relations; in
turn, they must adjust their policies to those of the foreign policy acquis
communautaire, the foreign agreements of the EU, and the acquis politique, the
declarations made and positions taken in the context of political cooperation.
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CHAPTER II
THE FIFTH ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION1
Enlargement is both a political necessity
 and an historic opportunity for Europe
         European Council at Madrid
       December 1995
The relations between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the
European Economic Community (EEC) developed in a very limited way throughout the
1970s possibly due to the political regimes of those countries. Some EEC Member
States had concluded bilateral agreements with the CEE countries, and the EEC itself
concluded some trade agreements covering specific areas. However, as of 1988, the EC
had established relations with the countries of the CEE, which led to a much closer
relationship, due to the collapse of the Communist regimes throughout the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe from 1989 onwards. With the end of the Cold War and the
disintegration of the Communist Soviet bloc, the Soviets lost their influence over the
CEECs, which created a power vacuum in the region. The EU is seen by the CEECs “as
a pole of stability for countries, which have mostly known turbulence, poverty and
                                                
1 This study does not examine the cases of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, which are also candidate countries.
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oppression during the course of the twentieth century. Western Europe represents peace,
freedom, order and prosperity”2. EU’s enlargement towards the CEECs could be
regarded as a “symbol of merging the CEECs back into the Western part of Europe, and
re-establishing a sense of ‘belonging’ that they have always claimed”3.
To this end, a special meeting of the European Council was convened in Dublin
on 28 April 1990 to discuss the unification of Germany as well as the developments that
were taking place in the rest of CEE. At that Council it was decided that discussions
should begin on Association Agreements, which were later called as “Europe
Agreements”, with the emerging democracies of CEE. In addition to economic issues,
the Council also decided that these agreements should include an institutional
framework for political dialogue. The EU committed itself to support the new
democracies during the transformation process. On that basis, an intensive cooperation
started, marked in particular by mutual market opening in goods and services4.
Before 1990s, the question of enlargement mainly focused on applicant countries
from the EU's southern periphery and northern European Free Trade Area (EFTA).
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus the fall of communism and the
spread of democratisation throughout Central and Eastern Europe; the European Union
has become "a pole of attraction" to the former members of the Communist bloc5. The
                                                
2 Victoria Curzon Price and Alice Landau, “The Enlargement of the European Union: dealing with
complexity,” in The Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price,
Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999) 12.
3 ibid., 13.
4 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement of the European Union," 439.
5 Mick Hillyard and Christopher Barclay, "EU Enlargement: The Financial Consequences, " Research
Paper 98/56 (1 May 1998), House of Commons Library, p. 6.
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Central and Eastern European countries, having emerged by their political upheavals
from the 'Soviet bloc', also saw EU membership as central to the principal foreign policy
objective of joining Europe6.
The decision of enlarging the Union towards the Central and Eastern Europe was
taken at the European Council in Copenhagen on 22 June 1993. To this end, the
European Council at Copenhagen agreed that the associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession
will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of
membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required7.
During the period following the Copenhagen European Council of 1993,
membership applications were received from Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Romania,
Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia between 1994
and 1995. Following the decisions taken at Copenhagen, a strategy was agreed to
prepare the applicant countries for accession at the Essen European Council of
December 1994. It was agreed to establish a multilateral "structured dialogue" between
the applicants and the EU institutions. One year later following the Essen European
Council, this time in Madrid, the Commission was asked to prepare a "composite paper"
                                                
6 Roger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, Revised Edition
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1997): 326-327.
7 Copenhagen European Council, June 1993, Presidency Conclusions.
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on enlargement, which was to become Agenda 20008 in July 19979. In Agenda 2000, the
applicant countries' eligibility for EU membership was assessed in terms of the
accession criteria set up by the Copenhagen European Council. The Commission
declared that none of the applicants from CEE countries fully fulfilled the criteria but
that “Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia could be in a position
to satisfy all the conditions for membership in the medium term if they maintain and
strongly sustain their efforts of preparation”10.
The Commission’s recommendations - Agenda 2000 - were also endorsed by the
Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 and accession negotiations were
agreed to be opened with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia (and
Cyprus), which were named as the "first-wave" and known as the "Luxembourg Six" as
well. Accession negotiations with the "first-wave" candidates were officially launched
on 30 March 1998 under the UK presidency. The opening of negotiations with the
“second-wave” applicants - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia plus Malta -
were approved at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, and the
negotiations with this group, which was known as the “Helsinki Six”, were officially
launched on 15 February 2000.
                                                
8 Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union covers the major issues, which the EU would face in the
long run, on the threshold of the 21st century. It covers not only the enlargement process, but also the
reforms in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Structural and Cohesion Funds as well as the
financial issues of the Union in the coming millennium.
9 "Enlargement of the European Union" Focus International (London: Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, An FCO Network Feature) April 1999: 5.
10 Agenda 2000, EC Cons Doc 9984/97, Vol I Part Two (VII).
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During the Austrian Presidency of the EU, from July to December 1998, the
“first-wave” countries were said to have made "good progress" on enlargement. The
initial phase (screening) was said to go well for (Cyprus), Hungary, Poland, Slovenia,
Estonia and the Czech Republic; and “substantive negotiations” began on the first seven
Chapters of the acquis11 on November 1998. The Commission published "progress
reports" on all the applicants, which stated “substantial progress had been made by them
but much work remained to be done”12.
In its July 1997 Opinions, the Commission analysed the progress accomplished
by the candidates of Central and Eastern Europe towards meeting the Copenhagen
criteria. This was followed by first Regular Reports13, including the 1997 Opinions, in
which the Commission based its assessment on the accession criteria, which have
already been defined by the Copenhagen European Council. To this end, the
Commission has been using the same method of evaluation in each time in order to
make successful comparisons from year to year14.
The EU has adopted a “special strategy” to help the applicant countries to
prepare for membership. The strategy had some revisions as the enlargement process
had advanced. This “special strategy” has two primary objectives: first is “to help the
candidate countries to deal with any shortcomings that need to be rectified before they
                                                
11 For the Chapters of the acquis see Appendix B.
12 "Enlargement of the European Union" Focus International, London, April 1999 Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, An FCO Network Feature, p. 7.
13 The reports primarily aimed to assess not only the capability of each applicant country to meet the
Copenhagen political and economic criteria but also its ability to implement the acquis.
14 Carole Andrews, “EU Enlargement: from Luxembourg to Helsinki and beyond” International Affairs
and Defense Section, House of Commons Library, 14 June 2000, Research Paper 00/62: p. 15.
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can join the EU”. The second is "to help the candidate countries prepare for their actions
and work as members of the Community"15. Recently, this strategy seems to have three
well-integrated components: the European Agreements, pre-accession partnerships and
the economic assistance.
2.1 European Agreements
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the EU began to sign "special
agreements" (association agreements) in 1991 with some of the countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, which are known as the "European Agreements". The successful
transition of those countries from communism to democracy and a market economy
required the establishment of a comprehensive framework. The negotiations opened with
the applicant countries and are being conducted according to the “principle of
differentiation”, which means that each country will be judged according to its level of
preparation. The negotiations take place in a framework of bilateral accession
conferences between the Member States and each of the candidates. The first bilateral
Association Agreements were signed between the European Community (EC) and
Poland and Hungary in 199116.
These agreements could be seen as a preparatory stage towards future EU
memberships. Today, all ten CEE countries concluded such agreements with the EU,
                                                
15 http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/eu_info/utvidgning_forbered.asp Wednesday January 16, 2002
“Preparations for membership”
16 "Enlargement of the European Union" Focus International, London, April 1999 Foreign and
commonwealth Office, An FCO Network Feature, p. 3.
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which implies "the gradual removal of customs tariffs and trade quotas for industrial
goods with the aim of promoting free trade, and the successive lowering of quotas for
agricultural products through continual negotiation"17. The "European Agreements",
however, are aimed not only to promote trade but also to establish good economic
relations with the applicant countries, which will help them to adapt their economies to
the internal market.
2.2 Pre-accession Partnerships
The EU has had special "pre-accession partnerships" with the applicant countries
in CEE. Those pre-accession partnerships set up a framework in which the applicant
countries are directed towards the reforms that they have to concentrate on. The primary
objective of those partnerships is to prepare the applicant countries to meet the criteria
imposed by the EU. Since the countries' shortcomings are varied, they probably need
different remedies in different areas in order to become qualified enough for
membership. Applicant countries have to prepare "national plans" for their accession, in
which they should make clear how they intend to adjust "Community law". Those
applicant countries must adapt to Community rules and standards in areas such as
legislation, customs, budgetary control, environment, telecommunications, statistic
energy, nuclear safety, transport, agriculture and business development18.
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“Preparations for membership”
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2.3 Economic Assistance
All forms of preparations of the applicant countries in CEE require economic
resources, which has been provided by the EU through three funding instruments,
namely the PHARE19 programme, ISPA and SAPARD programmes. The PHARE
programme has two specific priorities; the 30% of the funding is used for the
development of the applicant countries' institutions so as to "create a well-functioning
public administration". The remaining part of the funding, that is 70%, is used for the
business sector and for the infrastructure projects, notably transport systems and cross-
border cooperation.
The priorities of the pre-accession strategy are determined by the "Accession
Partnerships", which were applied in December 1999 for the applicants from CEE. The
priorities were set out per country in the short and medium run as well as the financial
assistance from the Community to meet these priorities. The pre-accession strategy has
additional elements of participation of the applicant countries in Community programs
and agencies. The applicants from CEE "take part in programs in the areas of education,
vocational training, youth, research, energy, the environment, small and medium-sized
enterprises, and public health"20.
                                                
19 It was set up in 1989 to aid the process of democratic and political reform in the applicant countries
from Central and Eastern Europe. For each country priorities were identified: private sector development
and enterprise support, administrative reform, education, health, training, research and nuclear safety.
20 http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50005.htm
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2.4 Candidates: Countries From Central and Eastern Europe21
2.4.1 Bulgaria22
According to its 2000 Regular Report on Bulgaria's progress towards accession,
the Commission concluded that Bulgaria continues to fulfil the Copenhagen political
criteria, covering the areas of guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and the protection of minorities23. During the nineties, the reforms of the
national political institutions have been achieved in Bulgaria24. Since 2000, significant
progress has been made in public administration reform, which, however, needs further
steps to ensure an efficient, transparent and accountable public administration25. The two
strategies of the government - judicial reform and combating corruption - are considered
as significant developments, which urgently need successful implementation. Bulgaria
has been criticised that insufficient progress had been done to improve the judiciary
                                                
21 see Appendix C for Country Profiles.
22 Bulgaria earned its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, but having fought on the losing
side in both World Wars, it fell within the Soviet sphere of influence and became a People's Republic in
1946. Communist domination ended in 1990, when Bulgaria held its first multi-party election since World
War II and began the contentious process of moving toward political democracy and a market economy
while combating inflation, unemployment, corruption, and crime. Today, reforms and democratisation
keep Bulgaria on a path toward eventual integration into NATO and the EU - with which it began
accession negotiations in 2000. This information was taken from CIA Factbook 2001
23 All the information about Bulgaria’s performance was taken from "2001 Regular Report on Bulgaria's
Progress Towards Accession", by the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001,
SEC (2001) 1744.
24 The official name of the country was the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (Narodna Republika Bulgaria)
from 1947 until 1990. It was renamed as simply the Republic of Bulgaria on 15 November 1990. for
further information see Roger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern
Europe, Revised Edition (London: Pinter Publishers, 1997): 187-210.
25 For more details about Bulgaria’s performance see Nikolai Genov, “The Southeastern European Path
Towards Globalisation: The Role of the European Union,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe,
Special Edition, 2001, p. 41.
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which remains still weak. Therefore, major efforts are needed to develop a strong,
independent, effective and professional judicial system. Furthermore, corruption is still a
very serious problem, which could only be dealt with anti-corruption strategy supported
by the government and the parliament26. Furthermore, although some progress has been
made on "human rights training of police" and on "combating trafficking of human
beings", there is still a need to address police behaviour, concerning reported cases of ill-
treatment"27.
In terms of economic criteria, the Commission states that Bulgaria is close to
being a functioning market economy. To become an effective as well as functioning
economy, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria should continue to implement
reforms to remove "persistent difficulties" in order to become able to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium-term28.
Although the Bulgarian economy has a good record of macro-economic
performance, with good progress in privatisation and structural reforms, inflation has
risen considerably in 2000. Furthermore, investment remains insufficient. In order to
deal with these obstacles, the authorities should urgently deal with the administrative
obstacles to private sector development, which seriously affects enterprise creation, their
development and their closing down. Furthermore, for sustainable growth, and building
                                                
26 2001 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession, p. 14.
27 ibid.,p. 25.
28 ibid.,p. 97.
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up competitiveness, higher levels of private and public investment are recommended as
key requirements29.
In general, Bulgaria has partially fulfilled and made progress on all of the "short-
term Accession Partnership priorities" concerning with the acquis, and already started to
deal with the majority of "medium-term Accession Partnership priorities"30. The
majority of the public opinion is supporting the EU membership as a foreign policy
priority of the Bulgarian foreign policy31.
2.4.2 The Czech Republic32
In its 1997 Opinion, the Commission recognised that the Czech Republic33
fulfilled the political criteria put forward by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993.
In terms of reform programmes, although the Czech government has taken the necessary
steps throughout the years for the development of central and regional administration,
the Czech Republic still lacks a "Civil Service Act" for its public administration. On the
                                                
29 2001 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession, p. 97.
30 ibid.
31 Nikolai Genov, “The Southeastern European Path Towards Globalisation: The Role of the European
Union,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001, p. 41.
32 After World War II, Czechoslovakia fell within the Soviet sphere of influence. In 1968, an invasion by
Warsaw Pact troops ended the efforts of the country's leaders to liberalise party rule and create "socialism
with a human face." The country’s official name was the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from July 1960,
a nominal federation comprising the Czech and Slovak Republics. It was renamed after the 1989
revolution, becoming the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic on 20 April 1990. The federation was
dissolved on 1 January 1993, to create two independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak
Republic. Roger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe, Revised
Edition (London: Pinter Publishers, 1997): 76-119.
33 All the information about the Czech Republic was taken from "2001 Regular Report on the Czech
Republic's Progress Towards Accession", by the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels,
13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1746.
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other hand, the reform programme concerning the judiciary has gained significant
momentum. Good progress has been made in the area of civil law. The Criminal law, the
organisation of the courts and self-government of the judiciary are the areas in which
serious steps are being taken. A radical reform in the Criminal Proceedings Code has
been adopted which aims to increase the capacity to investigate effectively and bring
cases efficiently to trial34.
Although some measures have been taken against corruption, it is still a
significant problem. Serious as well as increased efforts are necessary to fight effectively
with the persistent trafficking of women and children35. Although some efforts have
been made with regard to the minority rights, further measures are needed to combat
"widespread discrimination".
With regard to the economic criteria, although the Commission recognised the
Czech Republic as a functioning market economy, progress needs to be made in
strengthening corporate governance and the financial system36. Tight fiscal policies are
in place, inflation stands at about 9% and unemployment is among the lowest in Europe.
In terms of facing the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, the
Czech Republic should be able to cope. Trade has been successfully reoriented towards
the west. The country has a trained and skilled workforce. Its economy benefits from
strong direct foreign investment and relatively good infrastructure37.
                                                
34 2001 Regular Report on the Czech Republic's Progress Towards Accession, p. 104.
35 ibid..
36 http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/low/english/special_report/1998/eu_enlargement/newsid_61000/61672.stm
37 ibid.
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When the overall macro-economic performance is concerned, it could be said
that it had improved. However, the current account deficit has widened and the budget
deficit has considerably risen. "Growth has resumed and broadened, while the
favourable performance on inflation has been maintained"38.
When the performance of the Czech Republic is assessed, it could be said that
the large majority of Accession Partnership priorities have been addressed and overall
satisfactory progress has been achieved in meeting them. Although further efforts are
needed in some areas, the short-term priorities relating to the single market have
generally been met. The priorities relating to agriculture, the environment and Justice
and Home Affairs have been partially met; and limited progress has been made on
taxation39. When the medium-term priorities are concerned, those relating to the single
market have been met to a large extent, except as regards to public procurement. Also
the priorities on economic and monetary union as well as on taxation have not been met
yet40.
                                                
38 2001 Regular Report on the Czech Republic's Progress Towards Accession, p. 105.
39 ibid.
40 For more details about European Integration and the Czechs see Lenka Rovna, “Images of Europe: the
Czech Perspective,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition 2001, p. 62-69.
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2.4.3 Estonia41
The Estonian ruling elites consider Estonia as belonging to Europe and according
to the Estonian Prime Minister, Mart Siiman “[t]he participation of Estonia in European
integration is a natural process, which results from our centuries-long belonging to the
Western-European cultural area. Considering this background, an unification with
European structures means a restoration of historical, economic, political and cultural
ties”42.
According to its 2000 Regular Report on Estonia's progress towards accession,
the Commission reported that Estonia continues to fulfil the Copenhagen political
criteria concerning the areas of guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and
respect for and protection of minorities. According to the Agenda 2000, Estonia has “the
general traits of democracy and stable institutions, which guarantee a constitutional state
and the observance of human rights...”43. The 2001 Regular Report indicates that since
last year's Regular Report (2000) there has been no major political change in Estonia,
including the shift in government policy; EU membership is still a key objective in
Estonian foreign policy44.
                                                
41 After centuries of Swedish and Russian rule, Estonia attained independence in 1918. Forcibly
incorporated into the USSR in 1940, it regained its freedom in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Since the last Russian troops left in 1994, Estonia has been free to promote economic and political ties
with Western Europe.
This information is taken from "2001 Regular Report on Estonia's progress towards Accession" by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 13.11.2001, Sec (2001) 1747.
42 Aksel Kirch, Iris Brokling, Mart Kivimae, “Images of Europe - The Country Study Estonia,” Newsletter
Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001, p. 72.
43 ibid.,” p. 75.
44 2001 Regular Report on Estonia's progress towards Accession, p. 16.
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As already mentioned in previous Regular Reports, Estonia has achieved stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. Besides further progress, the
existing institutions continue to function properly. With regard to the "Language
Policy", which was put forward by the Commission as one of the key requirements of
integration of minorities, the Estonian Parliament amended the "Language Law" in April
2000, which was positively mentioned in last year's (2000) Regular Report. Estonia
should continue to take measures as regards to the integration of non-citizens,
reinforcing the capacity of the public administration and improving the judicial system
in order to meet the medium term priorities of the 1999 Accession Partnership45. For the
integration of non-citizens, Estonia has continued to make further progress by
implementing concrete measures, including the provision of language training for non-
Estonian speakers. Estonia should take measures to enable the Russian-speaking non-
citizens to become better integrated into the society.
 The Commission in its 1997 Opinion on Estonia's application for EU
membership with regard to the Copenhagen economic criteria stated that, Estonia “can
be regarded as a functioning market economy, [which implies that it] should be able to
make the progress necessary to cope with competitive pressures and market forces
within the Union in the medium-term". Similarly, in its 2000 Regular Report, the
Commission stated "Estonia is a functioning market economy and should be able to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the near term, provided
that it stays with its present reform path"46. Furthermore, it not only experiences high
                                                
45 2001 Regular Report on Estonia's progress towards Accession, p.15.
46 ibid., p. 25.
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growth, but also it has already made further progress in strengthening its macroeconomic
performance and stability, restructuring the enterprise sector. Additionally, it has made
considerable progress in implementing structural reforms in utilities and energy
sectors47.
Despite all those positive progresses in economic terms, the current account
deficit of Estonia remains high. Furthermore, high unemployment rates could be
explained by labour shortages.
Generally, Estonia has continued to make good progress in both adopting and
implementing the acquis. As regards the capacity to implements and effectively enforce
the acquis, Estonia has most of the necessary institutions in place. These institutions
need to be further strengthened and continued efforts are required in specific sectors to
further develop administrative capacity48. Estonia has continued to address aspects of all
the short-term 1999 Accession Partnership priorities and starts to deal with many aspects
of the medium term priorities including the areas of the internal market, agriculture,
fisheries, transport, employment and social affairs, environment, justice and home
affairs49.
                                                
47 2001 Regular Report on Estonia's progress towards Accession, p. 33.
48 ibid.p. 91.
49 ibid., p. 93.
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2.4.4 Hungary50
The Commission in its 1997 Opinion concluded that Hungary51 fulfilled the
political criteria identified in the Copenhagen European Council of 1993. Since that
time, positive steps have been taken in the area of public administration with the
introduction of a new legal framework, which increased the accountability and
efficiency of the administration52. In judicial administration the overall efficiency of the
Courts was improved with the introduction of additional measures in the area of
institution building, Although the fight against corruption was included in the political
agenda. Corruption still remains a problem, which still require the implementation of
additional measures to make the fight more effective53.
In the area of human rights and freedoms with regard to asylum, the situation
considerably improved with the implementation of faster and better procedures.
However, there is a need to address police behaviour, notably with regard to reported
cases of ill treatment54. With regard to the minority rights, new policy instruments
together with measures were adopted. Furthermore, measures, which were implemented
                                                
50 Hungary was part of the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire, which collapsed during World War I. The
country fell under communist rule following World War II. In 1956, a revolt and announced withdrawal
from the Warsaw Pact were met with a massive military intervention by Moscow. In the more open
GORBACHEV years, Hungary led the movement to dissolve the Warsaw Pact and steadily shifted toward
multi-party democracy and a market-oriented economy. The country’s official name was the Hungarian
People’s Republic till 23 October 1989, and thereafter the Republic of Hungary (Magyar Koztarsasag).
For more details see Roger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe,
Revised Edition (London: Pinter Publishers, 1997): 48-75.
51 This information is taken from "2001 Regular Report on the Hungary's Progress Towards Accession",
by the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1748.
52 2001 Regular Report on the Hungary's Progress Towards Accession, p. 98.
53 ibid., p. 98.
54 see also Pal Tamas, “Selling Europe to the Enlargement Countries: the Hungarian Approach,”
Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001, pp. 83-90.
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throughout the year 2001, mainly focused on the areas of education, employment, social
policy, legal protection and culture. Within this context, the Commission recommended
that it is important to enhance efforts to fight against widespread discrimination55.
In terms of economic criteria, Hungary is recognised by the Commission as a
functioning economy. The macro-economic situation continues to be remarkable with
high GDP growth together with current account development, declining unemployment
and favourable current account development56. However, the uncertainty over the further
reform of the pension system together with the delays in the reform of the health care
system have raised some doubts over the continuation of consolidation and the medium-
term sustainability of public finances. Therefore, the authorities should maintain fiscal
discipline so as to ensure that fiscal policy supports the new monetary policy framework
and the external balance. By this, they could contribute to lower inflation57.
Consequently, Hungary has continued to address its short-term Accession
Partnership priorities, except in the area of agriculture, audio-visual policy, free
movement of goods and competition policy. Besides, Hungary has implemented a
number of medium-term priorities in the areas of social policy and employment,
environment; and Justice and Home Affairs notably on asylum matters and visa policy58.
                                                
55 2001 Regular Report on the Hungary's Progress Towards Accession, p. 98.
56 ibid., p. 99.
57 ibid., p. 99.
58 ibid., p. 101.
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2.4.5 Latvia59
During the year 2000, the Latvian government intensively dealt with reforming
the Public Administration and the judiciary together with fighting against corruption.
However, further efforts60 are needed to make progress in Public Administration. The
completion of the legal framework and the development of a stable civil service
including the introduction of pay reform is important in that respect. In addition to these
developments, the Commission recommended that the reforms on the judicial system
must be carried on, with particular attention to the legal framework, speeding up and
enforcing court decisions, and addressing the issue of pre-trial detention61. Furthermore,
measures aiming at combating with corruption should be taken into consideration.
To promote the integration of non-citizens into Latvian society, significant steps
were taken, including the measures to facilitate the naturalisation procedure, the
adoption of a more elaborate Society Integration Program and establishment of the legal
basis for the future Social Integration Foundation62. In terms of "Language Law" and
"language training", which are the short-term priorities of the Accession Partnership,
Latvia has achieved some progress as well. Although Latvia has already achieved some
                                                
59 After a brief period of independence between the two World Wars, Latvia was annexed by the USSR in
1940. It re-established its independence in 1991 following the break up of the Soviet Union. Although the
last Russian troops left in 1994, the status of the Russian minority (some 30% of the population) remains
of concern to Moscow. Latvia continues to revamp its economy for eventual integration into various
Western European political and economic institutions. This information was taken from CIA Factbook
2001.
60 All the information concerning Latvia was taken from "2001 Regular Report on Latvia's Progress
Towards Accession", by the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC
(2001) 1749.
61 2001 Regular Report on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession, p. 111.
62 ibid., p. 111.
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progress in meeting the medium-term priorities in the areas of further integrating non-
citizens, developing the civil service and improving the capacity of the public
administration, further intensified efforts are needed to completely fulfil those priorities.
In terms of Copenhagen economic criteria, the Commission recognised that
Latvia is a functioning economy. It has already preserved macro-economic stability.
Furthermore, progress has been made on structural reform. Not only the last steps of the
pension reform, but also a new framework for financial supervision and a new
regulatory authority for public utilities have been introduced. Market entry and exit
mechanisms continue functioning in a satisfactory manner, and although the financial
sector is small, it is gradually consolidating63.
The Commission recommends to the Latvian authorities in order to keep budget
deficit as well as the current account deficit sustainable over the medium-term, "a policy
of fiscal discipline", in which a medium term fiscal framework to be followed64.
However, the process of privatisation of the remaining enterprises had developed more
slowly than expected; and therefore, it needs to be completed as quickly as possible.
Furthermore, unemployment still preserves its high levels and also labour market
flexibility should be improved as much as possible.
Consequently, Latvia has made progress on all the short-term Accession
Partnership priorities. In the areas of free movement of goods, social policy and
                                                
63 2001 Regular Report on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession, pp. 111-112.
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employment as well as environment, the process is close to completion. Additionally, all
the medium-term priorities have been addressed. Major achievement could be noted for
the free movement of persons, audiovisual legislation and customs. Although all the
medium-term priorities have been addressed, work towards all of the priorities should
continue, with particular attention given to those areas where some legislation still needs
to be adopted; such as energy, telecommunications, economic and social cohesion. Also
the administrative structures needs strengthening, such as agriculture, fisheries and the
control of EC funds"65.
2.4.6 Lithuania66
In its 1997 Opinion, the Commission recognized that Lithuania67 fulfilled the
Copenhagen political criteria. Since that time, Lithuania has made considerable progress
towards the accession priorities with regard to the political criteria. However, it has
made limited progress in implementing the public administration law and the civil
service law. In the areas of public administration and the judiciary, by re-organising the
administrative court system, Lithuania has made some progress. With the new Civil
Code, the legal system has improved68. By introducing the National Anti-Corruption
                                                
65 2001 Regular Report on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession, pp. 113-114.
66 Independent between the two World Wars, Lithuania was annexed by the USSR in 1940. On 11 March
1990, Lithuania became the first of the Soviet republics to declare its independence, but this proclamation
was not generally recognised until September of 1991 (following the abortive coup in Moscow). The last
Russian troops withdrew in 1993. Lithuania subsequently has restructured its economy for eventual
integration into Western European institutions. This information was taken from CIA Factbook 2001.
67 This information is taken from "2001 Regular Report on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession", by
the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001)
68 2001 Regular Report on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession, p. 108
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Strategy and its Implementation Programme by the Parliament and a new Law on
Corruption Prevention, some progress has been achieved in fighting against corruption.
In terms of economic criteria, Lithuania is recognized as a functioning market
economy. It has a macro-economic stability with improved fiscal and external balances.
Besides, it has reduced state interference into the economic field. The privatization in the
areas of not only banking but also land is nearing completion. However, unemployment
remains high and the structural problems on the labour markets should have to be
addressed69. Overall, with regard to the short-term and to a lesser extent, the medium-
term priorities of the Accession Partnership, Lithuania has made satisfactory progress.
2.4.7 Poland70
Since 1989, Poland and the other Central and Eastern European countries have
experienced enormous transformations (in the structures) and Poland could be regarded
as the pioneer of those changes, although Poland still has to deal with some challenges
to bring the country into the EU development level. The political reforms together with
the economic ones, have enabled the establishment of a pluralistic and democratic
political system, a civil society and a market economy, and the Polish foreign policy has
                                                
69 2001 Regular Report on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession, p. 109
70 Poland gained its independence in 1918 only to be overrun by Germany and the Soviet Union in World
War II. It became a Soviet satellite country following the war, but one that was comparatively tolerant and
progressive. Labor turmoil in 1980 led to the formation of the independent trade union "Solidarity" that
over time became a political force and by 1990 had swept parliamentary elections and the presidency. A
"shock therapy" program during the early 1990s enabled the country to transform its economy into one of
the most robust in Central Europe, boosting hopes for acceptance to the EU. Poland joined the NATO
alliance in 1999. This information was taken from CIA Factbook 2001.
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been re-oriented to guarantee a secure, friendly and permissive international
environment for further development71.
In terms of macroeconomic policy, Poland is regarded as one of the most
successful and dynamically developing Central European countries. Furthermore, a new
system of education, health care and social security was introduced in 1999.
Poland72 applied for EU membership on 5 April 1994 and since 31 March 1998,
it has been engaged in accession negotiations with the EU. Although it is not practically
possible to set a definite date for membership, Poland has declared its intention to be
ready to become a member of the EU by 2003.
To prepare Poland for the EU membership, a number of measures were
introduced concerning the adoption of the acquis as well as the further economic
reforms. In order to make Polish enterprises more competitive in the single market
privatisation and the restructuring of the economy are considered as the key areas. To
this end, most of the remaining states owned enterprises, namely major banks,
steelworks and other industrial plants were all to be privatised by the end of 200173.
                                                
71 Stanislaw Komorowski, "The Accession of Poland to the European Union," European Foreign Affairs
Review 5, 2000, Kluwer Law International, pp. 131-132.
72 The country was known as the Polish People’s Republic until 30 December 1989 and since then as the
Polish Republic (Polska Rzeczpospolita): Roger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in
Central and Eastern Europe, Revised Edition (London: Pinter Publishers, 1997): 9-47.
73 Stanislaw Komorowski, "The Accession of Poland to the European Union," 134.
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As in the case of most of the other countries, the Commission in its 1997
Opinion recognised that Poland74 fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. The 1999
Civil Service Law within the framework of public administration progress is still
continuing. However, further efforts are also required for its implementation, ensuring
that an independent, well trained and motivated civil service is in place by the time of
accession is necessary75. Furthermore, Poland has continued to make progress in
reforming the judiciary. Additional steps should be taken in the fight against corruption,
which remains a source of serious concern. The focus must be on developing an
administrative and business culture, which can resist corruption76.
Poland considers agriculture and the environment as the most difficult chapters
in the accession negotiations. Therefore, Poland considers restructuring as well as
modernising its agriculture; preparing this area for the implementation of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Despite the difficulties experienced in its agriculture, Poland
already declared that by the end of 2002, the Polish agriculture is going to be ready to be
completely covered by the CAP77.
In terms of economic criteria, Poland is recognized as a functioning market
economy. Despite its considerable progress in recent years, Poland’s growth
performance remains the weakest among other Central and Eastern European
                                                
74 This information is taken from "2001 Regular Report on the Poland's Progress Towards Accession", by
the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1752.
75 ibid., p. 104.
76 ibid., p. 104.
77 Stanislaw Komorowski, "The Accession of Poland to the European Union," 134.
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countries78. Privatisation continued and further restructuring has taken place in sensitive
sectors such as the coal and power industries. With the adoption of the new bankruptcy
law and the new Commercial Code, the legal framework for business has been
strengthened79. Poland has started to make progress in meeting all the medium-term
priorities. Progress has been varied, with the most obvious developments relating to the
legislative elements of the priorities80.
2.4.8 Romania81
Despite its long years of isolation and despite the images of the “West”, the 1989
change brought about significant positive modifications in Romanian view. The term
“West” was replaced by “Europe”, and new slogans were invented such as “We are
Europe too”, or “We are part of Europe as well”82.
                                                
78 “Country Focus: Poland”, EuroFocus, Vol. 8 no. 2, February 22, 2002, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, http://www.csis.org/europe/eurofocus/v8n2.htm
79 2001 Regular Report on the Poland's Progress Towards Accession, p. 104.
80 ibid., p. 107.
81 Soviet occupation following World War II led to the formation of a communist "people’s republic" in
1947 and the abdication of the king. The decades-long rule of President Nicolae Ceausescu became
increasingly draconian through the 1980s. He was overthrown and executed in late 1989. Former
communists dominated the government until 1996 when they were swept from power. Much economic
restructuring remains to be carried out before Romania can achieve its hope of joining the EU. The official
name of the country was the Romanian People’s Republic from December 1947 until 1965, thereafter the
Socialist Republic of Romania (Republica Socialista Romania) until 28 December 1989, when it was
renamed simply Romania. Roger East and Jolyon Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern
Europe, Revised Edition (London: Pinter Publishers, 1997): 153-186.
This information is taken from "2001 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1753.
82 Zoltan A. Biro and Zoltan Rostas, “Images of Europe in Romania: The EU Discourse,” Newsletter
Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001, p. 94.
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The Commission in its 1997 Opinion concluded that Romania83 fulfilled the
political criteria. Since that time, the efficiency of the legislation has been improved
effectively with the implementation of reforms, which would also play an important role
in fighting against corruption. However, despite all those measures against corruption, it
still remains a serious problem "that is largely unsolved"84. Furthermore, there is a lack
of progress in carrying out a strategic reform of the public administration and also the
independence of the judiciary should further be guaranteed85.
In the field of human rights, significant progress has been achieved. Those
developments could be summarised as follows: reform of the childcare system, new
legislation concerning the restitution of property and the treatment of asylum seekers
and refuges; and the initiatives which were taken to address trafficking of human
beings86. Furthermore, for extending the use of minority languages new legislation was
approved. However, despite those developments, further efforts are needed for the
implementation of this presented strategy with the aim of "effectively combating
widespread discrimination, and improving living conditions"87.
In terms of economic criteria, it could be said that Romania has made progress
towards a functioning market economy. Although it is not able to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term, it has taken measures
                                                
83 All the information concerning Romania was taken from "2001 Regular Report on Romania's Progress
Towards Accession", by the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC
(2001) 1753.
84 ibid., p. 101.
85 ibid.,p. 101.
86 ibid., p. 101.
87 ibid.,p. 101.
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that would allow developing its future capacity. There was some progress towards
macro-economic stabilisation; growth has resumed and exports have increased. The
government is aware of the need to implement the program agreed with the IMF and the
Pre-accession Economic Program. Notably in the area of privatisation and energy price
adjustments, structural reforms has been re-launched88.
However, high inflation together with a "widening current account deficit" leads
to serious economic imbalances in Romania. The still fragile macro-economic
environment, the uncertain legal framework and the poor administrative capacity hinder
the development of the private sector. Large parts of the enterprise sector have yet to
start restructuring or are still in the early stages of the process89.
As a conclusion, Romania has met the priorities related to transport. With regard
to meeting short-term Accession Partnership priorities, although some progress has been
made in the areas of taxation, customs, justice and home affairs, none of the priorities
identified for these sectors have yet been fully met. As for the priorities related to the
internal market, agriculture, environment, employment, social affairs and the
reinforcement of administrative and judicial capacity, there has been only some limited
progress. Romania has started to address some medium-term Accession Partnership
priorities that in the areas of transport and fisheries Romania is close to meeting the
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medium-term priorities. However, no substantial progress has been made in the areas of
agriculture, environment, and employment90.
2.4.9 Slovakia91
In its 1999 Regular Report, the Commission concluded that Slovakia92 fulfilled
the political criteria. With regard to the structure and functioning of the administration,
significant progress was attained. To strengthen the independence of the judiciary,
significant steps were taken particularly in the area of guaranteeing the judiciary's
professional impartiality and political neutrality.
Although some progress has been attained in fighting against corruption, it still
remains a significant problem, which further needs strictly enforcement of action
plans93. Furthermore, in the field of human rights, there is an urgent need to address the
police behaviour with regard to the reported cases of ill treatment. Significant efforts
were taken and the government strategies were implemented for the protection of
minority rights. In addition to this, positive developments could be observed in the areas,
notably in the use and in the protection of minority languages. The modernisation and
                                                
90 2001 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession, p. 104.
91 In 1918 the Slovaks joined the closely related Czechs to form Czechoslovakia. Following the chaos of
World War II, Czechoslovakia became a communist nation within Soviet-ruled Eastern Europe. Soviet
influence collapsed in 1989 and Czechoslovakia once more became free. The Slovaks and the Czechs
agreed to separate peacefully on 1 January 1993. Historic, political, and geographic factors have caused
Slovakia to experience more difficulty in developing a modern market economy than some of its Central
European neighbours. The information was taken from CIA Factbook 2001.
92 This information is taken from "2001 Regular Report on Slovakia's Progress Towards Accession", by
the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1754.
93 2001 Regular Report on Slovakia's Progress Towards Accession, p. 92.
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de-centralisation of the public administration, which were regarded as the short-term
priorities of the Accession Partnership, were accomplished. Furthermore, significant
steps were taken in strengthening the independence of judiciary, which is also a short-
term priority.
In terms of economic criteria, the Commission recognised Slovakia as a
functioning market economy. The Commission also stated that Slovakia will be able to
cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the near term
as long as it makes "further substantial efforts in medium-term fiscal consolidation and
in developing and fully implementing the announced structural reform program"94.
In terms of macro-economic stability, Slovakia has good records and it has
successfully maintained this stability. When bank privatisation was concerned, there has
been good progress, which is approaching completion. However, in the area of current
account deficit, Slovakia is experiencing a substantial widening, which urgently requires
a strict fiscal policy stance. In addition to this, unemployment rate is still high and
unfortunately rising. Some parts of the legal and institutional framework for enterprise
development are in need of further improvements and effective implementation.
Financial sector supervision has to be strengthened further. Steps must be taken to
ensure the medium-term sustainability of public finances95.
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Slovakia has met, to a large extent, the short-term priorities of the 1999
Accession Partnership in the area of internal market, social policy and employment.
Furthermore, the priorities have been partially met in the field of energy as well as in the
fields of justice and home affairs and to a limited extent in agriculture and environment.
All medium-term priorities of Slovakia has been partially met, with the exception of
transports policy, regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments as well as
environment, where priorities are fulfilled only to a limited extent96.
2.4.10 Slovenia97
Having less than 2 million people98, Slovenia together with Slovakia, has made a
remarkable progress and it is seen as a front-runner for the next wave of EU
enlargement. When the Slovenes became independent, their standard of living was
already the highest in the post-Communist Europe. Furthermore, due to its closest
relations with the Western markets, Slovenia’s transition to a more liberal society
seemed to be painful for most of its neighbours99.
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After World War II, Slovenia became a republic of the renewed Yugoslavia, which though communist,
distanced itself from Moscow's rule. Dissatisfied with the exercise of power of the majority Serbs, the
Slovenes succeeded in establishing their independence in 1991. Historical ties to Western Europe, a strong
economy, and a stable democracy make Slovenia a leading candidate for future membership in the EU and
NATO. This information was taken from CIA Factbook 2001.
98 For more details about the definition of Slovene people’s definition of Europe see Frane Adam, Mitja
Hafner and Samo Uhan, “Slovenia and the European Union: Attitudes and Perceptions,” Newsletter Social
Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001, pp. 141-150.
99 “Country Profile: Slovenia”, EuroFocus, Vol. 7 no. 4, June 19, 2001, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, http://www.csis.org/europe/eurofocus/v7n4.htm
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The Commission in its 2000 Regular Report on Slovenia's progress100 towards
accession recognized that Slovenia continues to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria.
Progress has been made in judicial reform, which is a medium-term priority in the
Accession Partnership101. As already mentioned in previous Regular Reports, Slovenia
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. In its
bilateral relations with other countries in the region, Slovenia made some initiatives,
notably the partial resolution of maritime border disputes with Croatia, the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and efforts to accommodate the Italian,
Hungarian and Slavic minorities within its borders102. However, little progress has been
made in the area of free movement of persons. To this end, the Commission
recommended that Slovenia should speed up "alignment especially on mutual
recognition of professional qualifications and on citizen's rights"103.
In terms of Copenhagen economic criteria, although the macro-economic
situation in Slovenia has generally remained positive in 2000, it weakened in 2001.
Inflation, However, increased considerably. Slovenia is a functioning market economy.
It seems to be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the
Union in the near term as long as it implements the remaining reforms to increase
competition in domestic markets104.
                                                
100 This information is taken from "2001 Regular Report on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession", by
the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1755.
101 2001 Regular Report on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession, p.14.
102 “Country Profile: Slovenia”, EuroFocus, Vol. 7 no. 4, June 19, 2001, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, http://www.csis.org/europe/eurofocus/v7n4.htm
103 2001 Regular Report on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession, p. 89.
104 ibid.,, p. 33.
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In terms of macro-economic developments, it can be considered that Slovenia is
generally in a favourable position: a steady GDP growth, low unemployment rate, and a
reduction in the current account deficit. However, the high rate of inflation is still a
problem in Slovene economy. Furthermore, labour markets are not flexible enough. To
this end, by decreasing the state's influence in certain areas of economy, the functioning
of markets could be improved105. Although the inflation rate – still at 7 per cent – will
have to fall closer to EU levels, Slovenia’s economy has been growing by 4 to 5 per cent
annually during the last couple of years.
The European Commission’s highly critical report in 1999 acted as a “wakening
call” for Slovene politicians who were reluctant to open their country’s markets to
foreign direct investment and implement laws, which would allow the privatization of
Slovenia’s telecommunications company and two remaining state-owned banks106. The
Commission advised that the authorities should immediately deal with the
implementation of the announced structural reforms and privatisation in a number of
sectors, notably banking and insurance. Those initiatives would help to attract foreign
investors and thus provide a better micro-economic basis for a sustained growth
performance in the medium term107.
The Commission stated since the last Regular Report, Slovenia has made
positive overall progress in implementing the acquis. Slovenia has met considerable
                                                
105 2001 Regular Report on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession, p. 33.
106 “Country Profile: Slovenia”, EuroFocus, Vol. 7 no. 4, June 19, 2001, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, http://www.csis.org/europe/eurofocus/v7n4.htm
107 2001 Regular Report on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession, p. 33.
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number of the short-term Accession Partnership priorities in the areas of the economic
criteria, internal market, agriculture, transport, environment, employment and social
affairs; and justice and home affairs. In other areas, namely the reinforcement of the
administrative and judicial capacity, including the management and control of EC
(European Communities) funds, the priorities have been met partially. Besides, Slovenia
has already begun to undertake a number of its medium-term priorities108.
With the end of the Cold War and thus the disintegration of the Soviet
Communist bloc, the EU, then the EC had begun to establish closer relations with the
countries of the CEE. The 21st century will possibly witness a new wave of enlargement
of the EU, which it had experienced four times in the past, this time towards the
countries of the CEE. There will be some possible opportunities as well as risks and
difficulties of this coming enlargement. However, a complete integration of the countries
from CEE with the European Union will probably be another momentous process in
those countries’ history after their withdrawal from the Soviet and later Russian, sphere
of influence as well as interest.
                                                
108 2001 Regular Report on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession", p. 35.
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CHAPTER III
A COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF EU
ENLARGEMENT
By enlarging the European Union, we
are  finally overcoming the cruel  and
unnatural  division of our  continent…
The 21st century will possibly witness a new wave of enlargement of the
Union, this time towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which
is regarded as one of the most important developments of the new century. The
coming enlargement is "historically unique" and probably the "largest challenge"
which the Union has ever faced, and is defined as a common project, which is
undertaken by its current members together with the applicant countries.
Furthermore, it is seen as a process dictated by ideals, moral values and interests that
"arise from consolidating the area of stability, security, and prosperity that has been
such an endearing and enduring legacy of Europe's last 50 years"1.
                                                          
1 "Enlargement: A Priority for the European Union," EuroForum 3:3 (March 20, 2001), Newsletter -
Europe, Program Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://www.csis.org/europe/euroforur/v3n3.htm
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The enlargement of the EU seems to be perceived by the countries of CEE as
a “historical chance” which will put a final end to the division of Europe. On the
other hand, the existing EU member states seem to present EU enlargement as a tool
to secure democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, as it once did in Greece,
Portugal and Spain2. The establishment of independent states in Central and Eastern
Europe in 1989-1990 and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991 were
considered as the events which had significant repercussions in recent history. Now,
the EU seems to face geo-political challenges, which necessitate the development of
a new policy together with new mechanisms in order to manage relations with the
new applicant countries3.
3.1 The Eastern Enlargement of the EU: “historically unique” versus
“largest challenge”
Although the EU has previously experienced several waves of enlargement,
the coming enlargement is considered to be very different from the previous ones and
seen as the largest challenge facing the EU in the coming decades. This concerns not
only the number of the countries with which the Union is negotiating at the same
time, but also the "existing substantial economic and social divergences" between
present and future EU Member States4. The further reasons, which make this
enlargement unique, could be summarised as follows:
                                                          
2 Christina V. Balis (ed.), “Enlargement: A Priority for the European Union,” A CSIS Europe Program
Report, Washington (May 2001)
3 Adrian Hyde-Price, “The new pattern of international relations,” in The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau and Richard G.
Whitman, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999), 118.
4 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement of the European Union," European Foreign Affairs Review 5
(2001), 443.
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First of all, in the history of its enlargements, the EU has never had to deal
with such a large number of applicants5 at the same time. Since the existing
economic and social gaps between the present and future EU members6 are quite
large both sides should show substantial ability as well as determination to consider
extensive institutional reforms7. This reform program, however, could only be
succeeded with strong Community institutions, with solidarity and flexibility8.
Secondly, the coming enlargement will have serious impacts on economic
and political structures of the Union and impose large budgetary costs. The Member
States will have to deal with economic, political and social problems, which will
possibly be imposed by the new members9.
Thirdly, the applicant countries of the CEE, which were the product of the
1989-1990 political upheavals, are relatively poor when compared with the previous
applicant countries, which are the present Member States of the Union. One of the
most significant challenges is that the CEECs are trying to join a Union, which is
more integrated as well as more complex when it is compared with the periods of
                                                          
5 There are ten applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe, plus Malta and Cyprus. When
Turkey is taken into account, which was granted only a candidate status in Helsinki European Council
in 1999, the number will then be 13.
6 The European Union currently has 15 Member States, which cover a land area of over 32 million sq.
km and has a population of over 370 million people. However, with the coming enlargement process,
the number of the EU member states is expected to grow to 28 with an area of approximately 5
million sq. km having a population of about 550 million citizens.
7 The former president of France, Valery Giscard d’Estaing commended about the future of the EU
and he was less optimistic. He warned “everyone knows that an enlarged Europe will not be able to
function in a satisfactory manner unless there is a radical reform of its institutions”. This information
was taken from Salahi Sonyel, "The European Union and the Cyprus Imbroglio," Perceptions 3:2
(June-August 1998) 74.
8 To find answers for sensitive questions, like the inclusion of the candidate countries in the structural
or agricultural policy of the Community. But also difficult questions like free movement of people,
purchase of property and justice and home affairs have to be carefully approached. Günter Verheugen,
"The Enlargement of the European Union," 443.
9 Victoria Curzon Price and Alice Landau, “The Enlargement of the European Union: dealing with
complexity,” in The Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon
Price, Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999), 13.
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previous enlargements. Since its establishment in 1950s, but notably since 1980s, the
Union has evolved considerably. It successfully developed its institutions and
programs in passing years. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the Union has attempted to
perform outside the economic fields: “it is gradually defining itself as an institution
created to uphold democracy and the rule of law”10.
However, until 1989, the countries of CEE were considered as part of a single
entity - the Soviet bloc - and although they had some minor differences, their
political and economic systems were closely controlled by the USSR. However, with
the end of the Cold War, which led the Soviet bloc to split into several states, the
newly emerging states naturally have common problems both economically and
politically in the 1990s. It is obvious that after long years of Communist domination,
it could not be easy for those countries to adjust their structures, both economically
and politically to the EU's complicated structure. It will possibly be difficult for those
countries to catch up with the changes that have taken place within the EU.
Economically, they have to deal with crisis, which led thousands of people to lose
their jobs. Politically, they have to create new political structures, which should
reflect the people’s expectations in a changing world11. Last but not the least,
experiencing Soviet dominance not only in political systems but also in their
economies, the CEECs seemed to lose their sense of freedom.
Since the establishment of the EU, then ESCC (EEC) in 1950s, EU’s legal,
economic as well as political structure has developed, which obviously makes
                                                          
10 Victoria Curzon Price and Alice Landau, “The Enlargement of the European Union: dealing with
complexity,” in The Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies, 13.
11 J. William Derleth, The Transition in Central and Eastern European Politics (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall Inc., 2000): 1-6 and http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/eu_info/utvidgning.forbered.asp
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membership obligations more difficult to fulfill successively. The EU is usually
described as a "moving train" that each time it enlarges, the demands it places on
new members are more extensive because the EU itself has developed further also12.
Throughout years, the Union is also developed in itself and is becoming a much more
complex structure. In addition to the developments in EU’s structure, the acquis
communautaire13 itself has expanded significantly over the years since the previous
enlargements. At the beginning, one of the most important features of the Union was
centered on the principles that applicant countries must accept the acquis
communautaire, which includes all previous treaties, case law and agreements.
In the fifth enlargement process, however, applicant states are faced with a
more complex as well as extensive acquis, which now included not only the above
mentioned principles, but also the second and third EU pillars of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and the
objectives and the progressive realisation of political, economic and monetary
union14, which were included by the Maastricht Treaty15 (the Treaty on the European
Union). In addition to the membership criteria which was introduced at the
Copenhagen European Council of 1993 the Luxembourg European Council of
December 1997 added that “compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a
pre-requisite for the opening of any accession negotiations” and that “economic
                                                          
12 Karen Henderson, "The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement," International Politics 37 (March
2000), 2.
13 Acquis communautaire refers to the whole range of principles, policies, laws, practices, obligations
and objectives that have been agreed or have developed within the EU: notably the Treaties, all
legislation enacted to date and the judgments of the Court of Justice, but also the finalites politiques
(ultimate goals).
14 Karen Henderson, "The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement," 3-4.
15 Carole Andrews, “EU Enlargement: from Luxembourg to Helsinki and beyond” International
Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, 14 June 2000, Research Paper 00/62: p. 9.
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criteria and the ability to fulfil the obligations arising from membership have been
and must be assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way”16.
3.2 Remarks on EU Enlargement
The Union's new attempt of enlargement towards CEE is seen as an "historic
opportunity", which will help to integrate the continent by peaceful means as well as
extend a “zone of stability and prosperity” to its new members17. With this new
initiative, the EU faced  totally new political challenges, on the one hand, there are
the efforts of the new democracies in CEE to adapt themselves towards the EU with
the aim to participate equally in it. On the other hand, there are the integration goals
of the EU which primarily cover the inclusion of the new democracies in the
integration process, “in order to overcome the divided Europe of the past"18. The
failure of the Union to enlarge to the East could have serious implications for the
future stability in this region, since the new democracies in the region have highly
adapted themselves to the idea of "re-unification of Europe"19.
                                                          
16 Luxembourg European Council, December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, para 25.
17 http://ipn.cec.eu.int/english/general-info/5-7-3.htm
18 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement of the European Union," 439.
19 Adrian Hyde-Price, “The new pattern of international relations,” in The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies, 115.
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3.2.1 CEECs' Views on Enlargement: Advantages and
Disadvantages
On the side of the CEECs, they are highly motivated towards integration with
the Union for the following reasons20:
First of all, the applicants of the post-Communist Europe are highly
motivated by the idea of "return to Europe", which implies that they will again
become a part of the region to which they have already belonged. In a sense, they
seem to look for acceptance and belonging, and separate themselves from Russia in
the east. The countries of the CEE regard themselves as "re-joining" rather than
"joining" the west.
Secondly, it is mostly believed that EU membership will bring economic
advantages due to a number of factors: free movement of goods and free movement
of persons, which are two of EU's freedoms, will open EU markets, and eventually
allow the citizens of CEECs to seek work where they wish21.
Thirdly, the EU is expected to bring further security guarantees. Fourthly, EU
membership allows participation in decision-making mechanism. Fifth is the
improvement in "social standards, safety standards, and a general increase in
bureaucratic competencies", which are all necessary for EU membership. The central
concern of EU policy-makers is the improvement of the interests of the weak and
                                                          
20 The information was taken from Karen Henderson, "The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement,"
8-9.
21 ibid., p. 8.
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disadvantaged social groups, which were often neglected in the CEECs in a
communist order22. Lastly, there is a fear of being left behind among the countries of
this region. As more neighbouring countries join the EU, the disadvantages of being
outside the Union will increase.
On the other hand, there are a number of arguments of the CEECs against EU
membership: the first is the "loss of sovereignty and political autonomy". Some
countries of the CEE have recently become independent from the communist rule,
thus, they have some doubts as well as reservations about re-entering another such
formation. The second argument against the EU is the high financial cost of
"harmonisation". This issue is important in such countries, which have major
economic problems and a low short-term chance of EU membership. The third
reservation is that "EU membership will place restraints on the political options
available to political elites in the individual states"23.
3.3 The Benefits of EU Enlargement
It is highly believed that the enlargement process will facilitate the
transformation process in the accession countries and strengthen their general
stability. It is further claimed that24
                                                          
22 Karen Henderson, "The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement," 8.
23 ibid., 9.
24 "Enlargement of the European Union", (Annex 2) Briefing Paper, June 1997, This paper has been
prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for general briefing purposes
http://files.fco.gov.uk/info/briefs/eu-enlargement.pdf
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- Enlargement will help to strengthen European security as well as stability
by binding the Central and Eastern European countries into EU's political
and economic structures. Enlargement will strengthen, in candidate
countries, the rules of democracy, and will consolidate the development
of civic society and the rule of law. Furthermore, it will contribute to the
regional peace and security in Europe, which will in the long run create
opportunities for economic development and social welfare in the region
by limiting the chance of major conflicts25. These benefits, which are
indicated by the British Government, will be both in political and
economic terms, derived from the economic integration, political
cooperation and joint effort in combating such problems like organised
crime or illegal migration26.
- Enlargement has been presented as a means to "project stability and
enhance security, and this is arguably an even more significant feature of
the next enlargement than previous episodes"27.
First of all, EU with its Member States is perceived as something of a
model, which symbolises "stability" through "sharing common rules".
The new member states are expected to adapt the principles of
democracy, commitment to liberal market policies, institutions together
with rules, as a model.
                                                          
25 Marc Franco, “The enlargement: the European Commission's viewpoint,” in The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau and Richard G.
Whitman, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999): 68.
26 Stanislaw Komorowski, "The Accession of Poland to the European Union," European Foreign
Affairs Review 5 (2000): 136 (Kluwer Law International)
27 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?," Working Paper 16 (July 1997), Institute of
International Relations, The University of British Columbia, 3.
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Secondly and more notably, joining the Union will have impacts on
economic development. Although adapting to the acquis communautaire
is not so easy, it guides new members "a route to economic governance
of a market economy"28. This period could be maned as a transition
period for the previously authoritarian states (post-communist states) of
the CEE. With the transition accomplished, the EU provides a model for
the institutions of a market economy. Economic development itself, it is
frequently argued, is related to political stability internally and, rather
more controversially, externally. This economic development can be
facilitated through aid and assistance29.
Thirdly, which is in a sense related to the above mentioned paragraph,
EU offers financial assistance through structural and cohesion funds to
facilitate economic growth to a level approximating 75 per cent of the
EU's average GNP per capita30.
Fourthly, the recognition and acceptance of the previously communist
states by becoming a member of the EU is seen as a significant step
which demonstrates EU's concern for the maintenance of "European
security environment" and "the global security equation"31.
- Enlargement will consolidate respect for human rights, including those of
national minorities, as well as promote good relations between the
                                                          
28 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?," 3.
29 ibid.
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
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countries of the region and open up borders. The peaceful integration of
minorities32, the fight against nationalism and the settlement of border
disputes are important contributions for European stability33.
- An enlarged Union will possibly play an important as well as determinant
role in world affairs (both politically and economically). The EU is trying
to adopt a new role in European and international affairs, which would
symbolise the ability of the Union to dictate or to direct the policies all
over the world. Thus, the coming enlargement will broaden the outlook of
the Union while increasing its weight in foreign and security policy as a
global actor.
- Enlargement will increase effective cooperation in the fields of Justice
and Home Affairs, which is regarded as one of the pillars of the European
Union, helping to fight crime and the menace of drugs, the effects of
which are felt throughout the continent.
- Enlargement will create higher environmental standards in the CEECs,
benefiting all of Europe by reducing trans-border and global pollution.
- Economic reasons are considered as one of the main reasons for
enlargement since it will widen the European market and thus will
promote for the prosperity of its Member States: adding new markets will
                                                          
32 For example, the integration of the Russian speaking community in Estonia and Latvia; and the
Hungarian minority in Slovakia seem to be all direct consequence of accession perspectives.
33 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement of the European Union" 443.
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help to stimulate economic growth both in the EU and in the new member
states, which then in the long run, there will be much more gains by
increasing the size of the European market34.
- In terms of economy, the enlargement will contribute to the emergence of
the largest market in the world, which will possibly provide the necessary
conditions in the global competition for the European economy35.
Furthermore, enlargement will open up markets in goods and services
between East and West, North and South, stimulating economic growth,
offering new trading opportunities for all, and leading to major increases
in trade between the CEECs and existing Member States. The eventual
advantages of enlargement to EU citizens are undeniable. It will create a
bigger internal market, more consumers to sell to, more business
opportunities, and promote stable, prosperous neighbours. In economic
terms, enlargement will expand the Single Market to nearly 500 Million
consumers, bringing wider choice and increased competitiveness.
Moreover, it will stimulate demand, growth and jobs throughout the
European continent, bringing greater choice for consumers and greater
opportunity for business36.
- The economies of both CEECs and the Member States seem to benefit
from “full access to wider markets and competition, which will encourage
investment and growth. The inter-relationship of liberal market
                                                          
34 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?"
35 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement of the European Union" 443.
36 "Enlargement of the European Union," Focus International, (London: Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 1999): 8.
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economies will play an important part in reinforcing security. It will also
seem to bring citizens wider choice and greater opportunities”37.
- Through economies of scale, enlargement will lead to the transfer of
technology and improvements in organisational skills (all derived from
free access to expanding markets), to a higher growth rate throughout an
enlarged EU. Enlargement is conceived as a way which will help EU to
increase its impact internationally. "The external reality of the EU as an
economic unit is that it is already a huge player in world trade.
Enlargement will increase the profile and clout of the EU as an
international economic actor, if only by virtue of its sheer size and
proportion of world trade"38.
- Enlargement will reduce migratory pressures by increasing prosperity.
According to Smith and Wallace, “while economic backwardness and
dislocation might be something of an inducement for migration, political
instability is a much greater determinant. Thus, enlargement is a way of
stabilising the new members' economies and keeping the working
population in place"39.
- More positively, the enlargement of the EU will consolidate the process
of political democratisation in the East, which will stimulate the further
modernisation of their economies and facilitate their integration into the
                                                          
37 “Enlargement of the European Union,” Briefing Paper June 1997: 1.
http://www.files.fco.gov.uk/info/briefs/eu-enlargement.pdf
38 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?"
39 ibid., 2.
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global economy. Furthermore, it will foster a greater sense of a shared
"European" identity and common interests. Above all, it will expand the
“zone of institutionalised multilateral cooperation” in Europe, thereby
strengthening the cooperative aspects of European international society40.
- Enlargement is expected to affect the issue of "labour movement", which
is also important issue as compared with other three freedoms: capital,
goods and services. "Enlargement might be expected to at least
marginally affect labour migration. It might be argued that the boost for
the economies of the new entrants would help to keep potential labour
migrants in their own countries"41.
- Enlargement will possibly double the EU’s agricultural labour force.
Furthermore, the EU’s agricultural area will increase by 60 million to 200
million hectares42.
- Enlargement is used “to broaden the sense to retain identity and to protect
at the same time the common European value of a democratic society and
a social market economy in the global competition”43.
- One of the significant motivations that drive Eastern European countries
towards the process of European integration is the “equal status that
                                                          
40 Adrian Hyde-Price, “The new pattern of international relations,” in The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies, 115.
41 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?"
42 Nicholas C. Baltas, “European Union Enlargement: An Historic Milestone in the Process of
European Integration”. This paper was presented at the Fifty-First International Atlantic Economic
Conference (March 13-20, 2002, Athens)
43 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement of the European Union" 444.
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smaller or less developed states seem to enjoy inside the European
Union”44. Thus, it is further claimed that enlargement could lead to a
better balance between larger and smaller countries of Europe.
3.4 The Costs of EU Enlargement
As it is frequently mentioned, enlargement poses both chances and challenges
which should be coped with not only by the EU as a whole but also by the countries
of CEE.
- The coming enlargement of the EU will be both “quantitatively” and
“qualitatively” different from previous enlargements. The previous
enlargement processes had almost no significant financial consequences
for the existing Member States that the accession of the new members did
not cause any problems. Indeed, the budgetary position of the existing
Members improved with the accession of new members. However, the
accession of CEECs will possibly cause some deterioration in the
budgetary positions of all current Member States, since the possible future
members are the post-Communist states of CEE with poor economic
performances45. The difficulty with this is that, “while the EU’s aggregate
GDP is greater, the relatively poor countries with underdeveloped markets
entering the EU reduce its average GNP per capita (at least in the short
                                                          
44 Iulia Motoc, “Europe and its Teleology: Is there a Central-Eastern Vision?,” (Cambridge: Harvard
Law School, 2000): 8.
45 Mick Hillyard and Christopher Barclay, “EU Enlargement: The Financial Consequences,” Research
Paper 98/56, House of Commons Library (1 May 1998): 9
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run) and structural change in the new markets makes for economic
benefits only in the very long run”46.
Furthermore, when the financial issues are considered, it is obvious that the
EU will possibly face major difficulties, concerning the EU budget
particularly due to the cost of enlargement. “On the one hand, the vested
interest of the countries and regions in the current 15 EU member countries
would fight for the preservation of their share of the budgetary receipts, while
on the other, the strict rules for the monetary union prevent the participating
countries from increasing their expenditures”47. Since the economic situation
of the applicants from post-Communist Europe are ranging from poor to very
poor, they will possibly try to use the EU budget in order to benefit as much
as possible, whatever their overall impact on the enlargement. As the last
enlargement process demonstrated, even relatively wealthy entrants sought
special assistance (in the EU context) for their regions and thus make claims
on the EU budget48.
The size of the countries, which make up the enlargement, is another
important consideration. If the country is both demographically large and
relatively poor in terms of EU standards, which is the case for Poland
particularly, then the implication of such a situation for the budget are
probably severe49.
                                                          
46 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?," Working Paper 16, 2.
47 Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, “The Economic Commission for Europe,” in The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau and Richard G.
Whitman, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999): 59-60.
48 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?," Working Paper 16, 8-9.
49 ibid., 10.
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- Apart from candidate countries’ requirements which should be
implemented before becoming EU member, the Union should also settled
some “technical” priorities before the forthcoming enlargement:
The Union recently implemented its monetary union, which could be
considered as a significant step towards overcoming the difficulties of
enlargement process. However, reforms should be completed in its
agricultural policy, since agriculture is another significant problem that the
greatest impact of enlargement is likely to occur in the Common Agricultural
Policy and in the Structural Funds, which are the two largest components of
EU spending50. EU prices and levels of protection are much higher than those
prevailing in the Eastern Europe. Therefore, before admitting those
candidates into the Union, necessary measures should be taken, since
otherwise, the EU would have another major budgetary problem51. “The
politics of agricultural subsidies, immigration or labour market legislation,
border controls and citizenship are all among those most hotly debated at
present”52.
- When the institutional issues are concerned, it could be observed that
there is a need to provide the new member country’s participation in the
institutional “decision-making” and “judicial structure”, which was
initially designed for only six countries in the 1950s. The original system
                                                          
50 http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/extrel/enlarge.htm “European Union Enlargement: Questions and
Answers”
51 Victoria Curzon Price, “Re-integrating Europe: economic aspects,” in The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau and Richard G.
Whitman, eds. (London: Routledge, 1999): 45.
52 Kjell Engelbrekt, “Multiple Asymmetries: The European Union’s Neo-Byzantine Approach to
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proved to be durable since it successfully endured the previous
enlargement processes. “Such institutional framework may be dynamic,
but some of the decision-making procedures and languages used in the
official business of the EU could become cumbersome in an EU of 25 or
even 35 member countries”53.
Thus, some problems will probably appear concerning the decision-making
arrangements and the operation of EU’s institutions. Large numbers, 20 or 25
member states at the same time, can create problems in reaching consensus or
can create new voting blocs and blocking minorities. The number of the
Member States in the Council of Ministers is another issue. For those issue
areas where unanimity is required, the concern is that the EU will possibly be
paralysed by the veto of individual states. Furthermore, the increase in
numbers will make the operation of the system more difficult than in the
past54. Therefore, making the decision-making system work is one of the
difficulties, which will appear with the increase in the number of EU
Members. Increase in number will possibly mean that there is considerably
less common ground between the Members55.
- The economic and social gaps between the existing Member States and
candidates will require the ability as well as willingness of them to
reform, which could only be overcome with strong Community
institutions. Furthermore, it is necessary to find answers to questions such
                                                          
53 Carol Cosgrove-Sacks, “The Economic Commission for Europe,” in The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies, 61.
54 David Long, "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?," Working Paper 16, 9.
55 ibid., 11.
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as the inclusion of candidate countries in the structural or agricultural
policy of the Community; free movement of people; purchase of property;
and Justice and Home Affairs56. Therefore, the Union has to reform its
institutional organisation prior to the coming round of enlargement.
- The possible difficulty which could be experienced by the applicants is
the implementation of the acquis communautaire, which is growing
frequently as well as costly to introduce, implement and enforce.
Furthermore, the applicant countries must be able to cope with the
European market and reform their internal structures where necessary,
particularly in industry, agriculture, the labour market, and the legislation
regarding social and environmental issues57.
- Consequently, although the coming enlargement of the EU poses
significant challenges not only for the CEECs but also for the existing EU
Member States, its benefits seem to exceed its costs in the long run. The
aim of the EU enlargement is presented as “re-integrate Europe”. As it is
mentioned above, it will help to strengthen European security as well as
stability by binding the countries of CEE into EU’s political and
economic structures. Furthermore, it will help to re-establish a sense of
cohesiveness among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that they
regard EU integration as a “symbol of merging” CEE back into the
Western part of Europe.
                                                          
56 Günter Verheugen, "The Enlargement of the European Union," European Foreign Affairs Review 5
(2001), 443.
57 Nicholas C. Baltas, “European Union Enlargement: An Historic Milestone in the Process of
European Integration”.
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CHAPTER IV
AN OVERALL ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN UNION’S
ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
After the radical historic changes of 1989, Europe has experienced a time of
transformation and uncertainties. EU enlargement will not simply mean the
“westernisation”1 of East Central Europe, rather, the eastern enlargement of western
organisations will act as a catalyst for change in all parts of Europe. In Eastern
Europe a threefold transformation process started: from dictatorship to democracy,
from planned economy to market economy and from a structure of joint policies to
national independence.
The European Union has, by offering the option for joining the Association
Agreements, committed itself to an eastern enlargement following the changes that
took place after the end of the Cold War. The approximation and integration of the
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) into the EU aim at consolidating
the transformation processes and ensuring stability and prosperity in Europe. The EU
enlargement follows the perspective “to realise an increasingly closer union of the
                                                          
1 Adrian Hyde-Price, “The new pattern of international relations,” The Enlargement of the European
Union: Issues and Strategies, 110.
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peoples of Europe”, which was laid down in the Maastricht Treaty2. At the same time
it provides a great chance to outline a political space based on the principles of
political democracy as well as further to explore new, expanding markets: on the one
hand the original number of EU members will more than quadruple by the
enlargement; the Union as alliance of western-style democracies will be strengthened
considerably. On the another hand, with another 106 million consumers –
approximately 30 percent of the present EU’s population- the European internal
market will develop new dynamic force in terms of growth3. Labor costs, which are
considerably lower in CEECs, offer interesting prospects for an effective allocation
of the European factor. The EU’s disadvantages compared with Japan and the USA
could be overcome, and its international competitiveness could be much improved4.
The eastern enlargement of the EU is therefore not simply a technical matter
involving changes to voting procedures or agricultural policy. Nor is it something
that concerns only the existing fifteen Member States and the applicant countries.
Rather, its major implications for the very constitution of European order, and for the
social sciences5.
                                                          
2 Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), A New Ostpolitik – Strategies for a United Europe (Gutersloh:
Bertelsmann Publishers, 1997), 48.
3 ibid., 49.
4 John Redmond and Glenda G. Rosenthal (eds.), The Expanding European Union: Past, Present,
Future (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 197-219.
5 Adrian Hyde-Price, “The new pattern of international relations,” The Enlargement of the European
Union: Issues and Strategies, 117.
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4.1 Member States` Perspectives:
      Widening Versus Deepening6
The main challenge which seems to face the Union concerning the coming
enlargement is how to enlarge the EU without minimising, even losing, the
advantages of the existing institutionalised cooperation inside the Union as well as
sacrificing the dynamism and integrity of the integration process. The problem is
how to combine widening with deepening in a political environment in which
increasing numbers of Europeans are questioning the advantages of integration7.
Enlargement focuses Member States to reconsider their objectives in the EU
and redefine its future direction. Many member state governments are reluctant to re-
open a debate on the pace and scope of integration because they are still traumatised
by the public reaction to the Maastricht Treaty. Governments are now convinced that
any new plans for the future of the EU will have to gain legitimacy through public
support, including referenda.
While member governments debate the deeping of the EU in regulatory,
social, monetary, and foreign policy, they are also considering “widening” – that is,
geographical expansion of the EU to include the new democracies of central,
southern and eastern Europe. If all the countries discussed as potential members –
including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and
Bulgaria, the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – were to join, the EU
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would close to double in size to twenty-eight members8. In fact, only three of the
four “Visegrad” countries (the Czech Repbulic, Hungary and Poland) are almost
certain to enter in the “first-wave” of enlargement around 2005. In its “Agenda
2000” report, the Commission recommended Slovenia and Estonia as well; this
limited expansion poses a far more modest challenge9.
Widening creates presures for fragmentation due to the greater number and
diversity of member governments whose policies must be coordinated. Not only are
there significant disagreements over the speed and scope of enlargement, but there is
general agreement that the entire body of existing common policies – the acquis
communautaire – particularly those involving financial outlays, can not be extended
to new members without substantial reform. Some members also feel that efficient
decision-making with more than fifteen members requires significant institutional
reform, including use of majority voting10.
Member States vary in their enthusiasm and motivations for wanting to
enlarge the EU eastwards. It is widely believed that the United Kingdom government
enthusiastically espouses an eastern widening of the EU in order to slow or prevent
the deepening of the integration process. British Prime Minister Major said in
Warsaw on 1 August 1994 that the EU would not be complete until the CEECs were
members and, at Leiden on 7 September 1994, he stated that a free, stable,
                                                          
8 This number includes the Mediterranean countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
9 Andrew Moravcsik (ed.), Centralisation or Fragmentation?: Europe Facing the Challenges of
Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy, 63.
10 ibid., 37.
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prosperous and democratic Central Europe will be a huge benefit to the whole
continent11.
By geography, history and culture, Germany has a special interest and
obligation towards the CEECs, although it recognises that integration of the CEECs
is a challenge for the whole of the Europe. Germany wants to bring itself back into
the centre of Europe and away from its edge. Four and a half decades of post-war
policy should be sufficient evidence to testify that it is not flirting with the earlier
concept of “seesaw policy”12 between East and West. Moving Germany back to the
middle of Europe should benefit all Europeans.
Worried by instability in the east and potential mass migration from the east,
Germany is pressing for an early eastern enlargement. It wants to develop a
structured relationship between the EU and CEECs as envisaged by the Copenhagen
Summit. This means keeping a delicate balance between the necessary respect for the
internal decision making process of the Union, and the necessary inclusion and
possible participation of the CEECs13. Secondly, it wants to improve the readiness
and ability of CEECs to assume the acquis communautaire.
France and Spain now regard enlargement to the east as inevitable but they
want assurances that an eastern enlargement will not weaken the EU or dilute it into
a free trade area. Whilst welcoming the CEECs as part of “our European family”14,
                                                          
11 Nicholas Hopkinson, The Southern and Eastern Enlargements of the European Union, (London:
HMSO Publications, 1995), 35.
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13 John A. Usher, The State of the European Union: Structure, enlargement and economic union
(Essex: Pearson Education Press, 2000), 112.
14 Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), A New Ostpolitik – Strategies for a United Europe, 75.
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France fears that the level of the EU’s affluence and effectiveness may be adversely
affected. As the new Member States are likely to have long transition periods, they
should not be so long as to permanently stall the deepening of EU integration. France
also remains reluctant entertain any further reform of the CAP which will inevitably
be raised as part of a CEEC negotiating agenda.
The German and French approaches derive from a common philosophy: the
pace and scope of European integration should not be dictated by the most reluctant
members, or by those who cannot cope with the obligations of full membership. As
the leaders of the EU gather to discuss the possibilities of further EU expansion,
there are a number of key issues which will need to be resolved in order for the
Union to function. Foremost of these is the debate over deepening of the EU versus
its enlargement. The larger states like Germany and France would prefer to see more
integration both politically and economically of the EU and its member states. On the
other side of the issue there are those who prefer expansion of the Union, with
emphasis given to further development of the “Single Market”. Larger states are
hesitant to include smaller, less economically stable countries, fearing the widened
gap between rich and poor countries within the Union would precipitate large
transfer payments, and ultimately slow down the deepening process within the EU15.
To the pan-European deepening and widening go together. The ever closer
Union is not exclusive. To a closet sceptic, widening can only mean dilution; much
larger assemblage of countries at widely differing stages of economic development
can not easily move as fast as a smaller group, which itself began with geographical
                                                          
15 “Introduction to Expansion of the European Union: The Politics of Enlargement”
http://www.indiana.edu/~unionet/topics1-1.htm
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neighbours and pre-existing high levels of mutual trade. Power of decision and cash
to spend have to be shared out relatively. An EU with more than 15 members will be
unable to function unless its institutions and decision-making procedures are
reformed. A widening to the East will necessitate more majority voting in the
Council. Even though there are many obstacles to CEEC membership, the EU can
not abandon its eastern neighbours for reasons of economic self-interest, wanting to
be bordered by democratic and stable neighbours, and the historical imperative to
unify Europe. Although intra-CEEC regional co-operation has been encouraged,
there is no real alternative for the CEECs other than to join the EU16.
Relations with Eastern Europe have posed some of the greatest challenges
that the EC/EU has ever had to face. If these challenges are adequately met,
European peace, prosperity and integration will be enormously enhanced. If they are
not met, the damaging consequences will not be confined to the East. Compared with
the re-construction in Western Europe, the western community reacted too passively
to the radical changes in Eastern Europe. The countries of Western Europe are the
only countries with the necessary resources to stabilise the old Continent; to be
involved within its framework is the target of most reform states. Europe is in need
of a political concept of relations towards Eastern Europe, which permits to direct
transformation and take the edge off inevitable dividing lines. In Central and Eastern
Europe the focus is to be placed on EU enlargement, stabilising peace is of major
importance in the Balkans.
Even though the associated countries of CEE have made considerable
progress on the way towards democracy and market economy, the lasting success of
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transformation is not secure. Growing social inequality and unemployment
strengthen populist forces. The earnings gap between east and west provides further
incentives for migration into the EU. If environmental protection in CEE continues to
be neglected, cross-border emission, ecological damage and re-development costs
can assume high proportions for the west. The spread of criminal structures discredits
the new democratic institutions established under the rule of law and fuels the fear of
eastern enlargement in the EU member states17.
Meanwhile, the greatest obstacle to an eastern enlargement of the EU is no
longer the state of development of the CEE states, but the weak reform capacity of
the European Union. Without a fundamental reform of institutions as well as
structural and agricultural policy, incapacitation and insolvency of an enlarged Union
are imminent. Without a compromise between present member states, eastern
enlargement will fail because of intensified distribution conflicts within the
Community.
The states associated with the EU can guarantee the success of eastern
enlargement by pushing the application of the acquis communautaire of the EU
beyond the basic criteria of the Copenhagen Summit, by avoiding special national
demands and by definitely settling intra-regional conflicts before joining the EU.
More efficient decision-making processes are required in order to secure the
efficiency of the EU18. The necessary reforms include the extension of majority
                                                          
17 Marc Franco, “The enlargement: the European Commission's viewpoint,” The Enlargement of the
European Union: Issues and Strategies Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman
(eds.), (London: Routledge, 1999): 67.
18 Karen Henderson, "The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement," International Politics 37 (March
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decisions in the Council of Ministers and the strengthening of the political leadership
by modernising the presidency, reducing the Commission in size and consolidating
the European Parliament. The CAP must be reoriented towards the market, and
financial means from the structural funds must be geographically and thematically
concentrated. Therefore, it can be argued that with eastern enlargement the European
Union will need a new concept to define its self-image and its future role and
structure19. Although CEECs are increasingly more realistic about the timing of
accession, wishful thinking amongst candidates about the prospects for membership
should not obscure the hard reality that small but powerful interest groups, namely
farmers and poor regions, are delaying, if not blocking, enlargement to preserve
relatively small dispersements from the EU20.
Member states interests in enlargement vary according to their proximity to
potential areas of instability on the peripheries of the EU, their economic integration
with CEE and their historical links with particular countries. EU countries in close
geographical proximity to CEE tend both to have more immediate concerns about
security and stability, and in many cases to have closer economic ties than the rest of
the EU21.
Other countries are much more ambivalent about enlargement. France is
notably so. The emergence of a reunified Germany with strong economic ties in CEE
implies a major shift in the European centre of gravity which enlargement will
                                                          
19 Andrew Moravcsik (ed.), Centralisation or Fragmentation?: Europe Facing the Challenges of
Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy, 159-185.
20 Nicholas Hopkinson, The Southern and Eastern Enlargements of the European Union, 45.
21 This applies to the Scandinavian member states, Finland, Germany, Austria, Greece and, to a lesser
extent, Italy. Some countries further from the EU’s eastern border have also emphasised the
importance of stability and security in the new Europe, most notably the UK.
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reinforce. Further south, Spain and Portugal, have few reasons to express positive
interest in enlargement; they want to protect budgetary transfers that might be
threatened by enlargement. Nor is enlargement strongly supported by small and
traditionally integrationist countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg.
Geo-political and economic interests affect not only overall policy stances on
enlargement but also views on which CEE countries are most important. Despite the
general stress on equal treatment and objective criteria, it is widely recognised that
the Scandinavian countries are particularly concerned about stabilising the three
Baltic applicants, while Germany is more focused on Poland followed by the Czech
Republic and Hungary, and further South Greece has an especial interest in
successful transition of Bulgaria and Romania22. The extent to which all EU member
states are really committed to bringing in all ten of the applicants is open to doubt.
Furthermore, although historical experience may lead some member states to
recognise the moral dimension of enlargement23, which is unlikely to override
political and economic interests.
Member states’ motivations and attitudes to enlargement are also affected by
their attitudes towards European integration and their views on the EU’s institutional
and policy development. Many member states have expressed the view that
enlargement must not impede the effective functioning of the EU, and there have
been widespread suspicions the UK’s support for enlargement reflected a desire to
see a weaker, looser EU rather than genuine geopolitical and security concerns.
                                                          
22 Kiander Baldwin. Expanding Membership of the European Union (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 45.
23 Notably the way in which accession helped to consolidate democratization in Greece, Portugal and
Spain.
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France, Belgium and Italy issued a joint declaration after the Amsterdam Treaty was
signed calling for more institutional reform prior to the first accession, seeming to
make this a prerequisite for enlargement. Thus, although UK support for enlargement
may be seen as potentially undermining integration, other member states’ support for
integration might undermine the enlargement process24.
For two generations, the European Union has symbolised the cooperative
commitment to post war European economic growth and geo-political stability. In
doing so it has fundamentally altered the way people think about national
sovereignty and identity. The EU is today the most highly developed and broadly
effective voluntary inter-governmental organisation in human history. It is more than
a single, integrated market and trading block among fifteen countries and over 300
million people, which would itself be a monumental achievement; it is a unique
quasi-constitutional polity25.
In sum, it can be said that the new enlargements are likely to differ radically
from earlier ones, thereby presenting the Commission with unique challenges and
responsibilities. First, the large number and varying size of the central and eastern
European potential members, and their relatively low level of economic
development, have implications for the enlargement process, and especially for the
future functioning of the EU’s institutions and policies. As a result, the Union has
adopted a new approach to the earlier stages of the CEECs enlargement, modifying
the Commission’s role accordingly. The Commission has assumed much greater
responsibility than in any previous enlargement for helping to prepare the new
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applicants for membership. Of course, most countries from previous accessions had
levels of economic and administrative development similar to that of the existing
member states. Greece, Portugal, and Spain are the obvious exceptions.
Understandably, the Union’s approach to the eastern European accession is dictated
in part by lessons from the Mediterranean enlargement, and especially by the
problems of Greece’s assimilation26.
Also, the EU’s acquis and policies have developed greatly since the
Mediterranean enlargements. In particular, the implementation of the single market
program opened up an even greater gap between the member states and the Europe
Agreement countries. Accordingly, at the request of the heads of state and
government at the Corfu summit, the Commission, along with the Council, drafted a
comprehensive strategy for preparing the Europe Agreement countries to join the
Union. The essential element of the strategy approved at the subsequent December
1994 Essen summit was to facilitate the countries’ progressive integration into the
internal market, through their phased adoption of the EU’s expanded acquis27. To get
the process going, the Commission undertook at the Essen summit to present to the
next European Council a White Paper outlining the measures the CEECs will need to
adopt to participate in the single market. At the same time, the Commission would
propose policies to promote integration through the development of infrastructure;
cooperation in the framework of trans-European networks; and the promotion of
intra-regional cooperation, environmental cooperation, and cooperation in pillars two
and three of the Maastricht Treaty. The opening of EU membership to the east,
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together with the new Mediterranean applications, raises the prospect of a Union of
at least twenty members within the next ten to twenty years28.
All EU members have an interest in ensuring that the large region on their
doorstep is stable, secure and prosperous. Since the Copenhagen European Council
in 1993, which formally committed the EU to the principle of enlargement to all ten
CEE applicants, member states have generally supported enlargement as a way of
promoting stability and prosperity in Europe by bringing the CEE countries into the
EU’s frameworks of economic and political integration. However, individual
member states degree of commitment to the process is open to question, there is
debate about how fast enlargement should proceed and how far eastwards it should
go29.
The eastward expansion will have an impact beyond its profound effects on
the EU and the applicants. Extending the borders of the EU will increase its weight
in the region, as well as globally, in areas such as trade negotiations. Although the
process of enlargement may help to stabilise the applicants and guide their post-
communist transitions, the EU will face difficult strategic issues on its new eastern
and southern frontiers, and these may themselves be complicated by the EU’s
expansion.
In the next decade the EU could receive further applications from the east and
south: in particular, Ukraine, Moldova, Albania, and the remaining former Yugoslav
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1996), 233-243.
29 Kiander Baldwin, Expanding Membership of the European Union, 51.
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republics might apply. This prospect raises further difficult challenges for the EU in
considering notions of solidarity and identity in Europe, it should be becareful how
far it extends without losing its cohesion and effectiveness. Also, the EU members,
both old and new, might face some difficulties in developing constructive relations
with neighbours that remain far from the prospect of membership.
Overall, member states’ differing interests in and degrees of commitment to
enlargement mean that keeping the process on track and maintaining its momentum
will require astute political bargaining and complex alliances between member states,
even before considering the challenges faced by the applicants. The Commission
alone can not drive enlargement forward politically. Although there is a role for the
UK and the Nordic countries here, Germany has to be a central part of the answer.
Successful enlargement demands strategic leadership; whether it will emerge is
currently an open question30.
Although formal acceptance of enlargement has been stated in EU
declarations, all Member States do not share a sufficient enthusiasm to guarantee
speedy or harmonious accessions. Opinion remains divided within the EU over
which kinds of changes need to be made to accommodate further enlargement. With
such uncertainty, CEEC leaders fear that EU promises will not be fulfilled, thus
leaving them in trouble with their electorates to whom they have promised rapid
membership in return for their patience in enduring difficult economic transitions.
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The question to be asked, however, is not if the CEECs will be admitted into
the Union, but when they will be admitted. Before expansion comes about there will
also be more discussion concerning the institutions which govern integration in the
EU. Governance of the Union is a historically difficult endeavour given the fact that
EU institutions are not too strong enough to replace national institutions. The
challenge will be to develop a form of leadership able to adapt to the differing policy
preferences of member states in order to effectively pursue economic integration
through expansion of the “Single Market”, and also continued monetary integration
(EMU).
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APPENDIX A
Treaty Establishing the European Community as Amended by Subsequent
Treaties
Rome, 25 March, 1957
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, HIS ROYAL
HIGHNESS THE PRINCE ROYAL OF BELGIUM, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, HER
ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBOURG, HER
MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS,
CONSIDERING that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts
commensurate with the dangers that threaten it,
CONVINCED that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make
to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations,
RECOGNIZING that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which
will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases
for economic development,
ANXIOUS to help, by expanding their basic production, to raise the standard of
living and further the works of peace,
RESOLVED to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests;
to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the
foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward
shared,
HAVE DECIDED to create a EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY and
to this end have designated as their Plenipotentiaries:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
Dr Konrad ADENAUER, Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs;
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HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE ROYAL OF BELGIUM:
Mr Paul VAN ZEELAND, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr Joseph MEURICE, Minister for Foreign Trade;
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC:
Mr Robert SCHUMAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC:
Mr Carlo SFORZA, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE GRAND DUCHESS OF LUXEMBOURG:
Mr Joseph BECH, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS:
Mr D. U. STIKKER, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr J. R. M. VAN DEN BRINK, Minister for Economic Affairs;
WHO, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed
as follows.
TITLE I
The European Coal and Steel Community
Article 1
By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, founded upon a common market,
common objectives and common institutions.
Article 2
The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute, in
harmony with the general economy of the Member States and through the
establishment of a common market as provided in Article 4, to economic expansion,
growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States.
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The Community shall progressively bring about conditions which will of themselves
ensure the most rational distribution of production at the highest possible level of
productivity, while safeguarding continuity of employment and taking care not to
provoke fundamental and persistent disturbances in the economies of Member States.
Article 3
The institutions of the Community shall, within the limits of their respective powers,
in the common interest:
a. ensure an orderly supply to the common market, taking into account the needs of
third countries;
b. ensure that all comparably placed consumers in the common market have equal
access to the sources of production;
c. ensure the establishment of the lowest prices under such conditions that these
prices do not result in higher prices charged by the same undertakings in other
transactions or in a higher general price level at another time, while allowing
necessary amortisation and normal return on invested capital;
d. ensure the maintenance of conditions which will encourage undertakings to
expand and improve their production potential and to promote a policy of using
natural resources rationally and avoiding their unconsidered exhaustion;
e. promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for the
workers in each of the industries for which it is responsible, so as to make possible
their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained;
f. promote the growth of international trade and ensure that equitable limits are
observed in export pricing;
g. promote the orderly expansion and modernisation of production, and the
improvement of quality, with no protection against competing industries that is not
justified by improper action on their part or in their favour.
Article 4
The following are recognized as incompatible with the common market for coal and
steel and shall accordingly be abolished and prohibited within the Community, as
provided in this Treaty:
a. import and export duties, or charges having equivalent effect, and quantitative
restrictions on the movement of products;
b. measures or practices which discriminate between producers, between purchasers
or between consumers, especially in prices and delivery terms or transport rates and
conditions, and measures or practices which interfere with the purchaser's free choice
of supplier;
c. subsidies or aids granted by States, or special charges imposed by States, in any
form whatsoever;
d. restrictive practices which tend towards the sharing or exploiting of markets.
Article 5
The Community shall carry out its task in accordance with this Treaty, with a limited
measure of intervention.
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To this end the Community shall:
- provide guidance and assistance for the parties concerned, by obtaining
information,
- organizing consultations and laying down general objectives;
- place financial resources at the disposal of undertakings for their investment and
bear part of the cost of readaptation;
- ensure the establishment, maintenance and observance of normal competitive
conditions and exert direct influence upon production or upon the market only
when circumstances so require;
- publish the reasons for its actions and take the necessary measures to ensure the
observance of the rules laid down in this Treaty.
The institutions of the Community shall carry out these activities with a minimum of
administrative machinery and in close cooperation with the parties concerned.
Article 6
The Community shall have legal personality.
In international relations, the Community shall enjoy the legal capacity it requires to
perform its functions and attain its objectives.
In each of the Member States, the Community shall enjoy the most extensive legal
capacity accorded to legal persons constituted in that State; it may, in particular,
acquire or dispose of movable and immovable property and may be a party to legal
proceedings.
The Community shall be represented by its institutions, each within the limits of its
powers.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTERS OF ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE
1. Free movement of goods
2. Freedom of movement for persons
3. Freedom to provide services
4. Free movement of capital
5. Company law
6. Competition policy
7. Agriculture
8. Fisheries
9. Transport policy
10. Taxation
11. Economic and monetary union
12. Statistics
13. Social policy and employment
14. Energy
15. Industrial policy
16. Small and medium-sized
undertakings
17. Science and research
18. Education and training
19. Telecommunications and
information technologies
20. Culture and audiovisual policy
21. Regional policy and co-ordination
of structural instruments
22. Environment
23. Consumers and health protection
24. Co-operation in the fields of
Justice and Home Affairs
25. Customs Union
26. External relations
27. Common foreign and security
policy
28. Financial control
29. Financial and budgetary provisions
30. Institutions
31. Other
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APPENDIX C
COUNTRY PROFILE
Country Capital Currency Europe Agreement   EU
  Signed            application
Bulgaria Sofia Lev 8/3/93 14/12/95
Czech Republic Prague Koruna 4/10/93 17/1/96
Estonia Tallinn Kroon 12/6/95 24/11/95
Hungary Budapest Forint 16/12/91 31/3/94
Latvia Riga Lats 12/6/95 13/10/95
Lithuania Vilnius Litas 12/6/95 8/12/95
Poland Warsaw Zloty 16/12/91 5/4/94
Romania Bucharest Leu 1/2/93 22/6/95
Slovakia Bratislava Koruna 4/10/93 27/6/95
Slovenia Ljubljana Tolar 10/6/96 10/6/96
102
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Arter, David. The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century.
Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993.
Baldwin, Kiander. Expanding Membership of the European Union. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Bideleux, Robert. European Integration and Disintegration. New York: Routledge,
1996.
Croft, Stuart. The Enlargement of Europe. New York: Manchester University Press,
1999.
Derleth, J. William. The Transition in Central and Eastern European Politics. New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 2000.
East, Roger and Jolyon Pontin. Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern
Europe, Revised Edition. London: Pinter Publishers, 1997.
Featherstone, Kevin and Kostas Ifantis (eds). Greece In a Changing Europe: between
European integration and Balkan disintegration?. New York: Manchester University
Press, 1996.
Hix, Simon. The Political System of the European Union. London: Macmillan, 1999.
Hopkinson, Nicholas. The Southern and Eastern Enlargements of the European
Union. London: HMSO Publications, 1995.
Hurwitz, Leon. The State Of The European Community. Harlow: Longman, 1991.
103
Kazakos, Panos and P.C.Ioakimidis (eds.). Greece and EC Membership Evaluated.
London : Pinter Publishers, 1994.
Kourvetaris, George A. and Andreas Moschonas. The Impact of European
Integration: Political, Sociological, Economic Changes. Westport: Praeger
Publishers, 1996.
Laurent, Pierre-Henri. The State of the European Union. Harlow: Longman, 1998.
McCormick, John. Understanding the European Union. New York: Palgrave, 1999.
McAllister, Richard. From EC to EU: a historical and political survey. New York:
Routledge, 1997.
Moravcsik, Andrew (ed.). Centralisation or Fragmentation?: Europe Facing the
Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy. New York: Brookings
Institution Press, 1998.
Nicoll, Sir William and Trevor C. Salmon. Understanding the European Union.
Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001.
Norgaard, Ole, Thomas Pedersen and Nikolaj Petersen. The European Community in
World Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.
Nugent, Neill (ed.). The European Union. Volume I. Vermont: Dartmouth, 1997.
Price,Victoria Curzon, Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman (eds.) The
Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies. London: Routledge,
1999.
Redmond, John (ed.). The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union. Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997.
------------------------- and Glenda G. Rosenthal (eds.). The Expanding European
Union: Past, Present, Future. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
Richardson, Jeremy (ed.). European Union: Power and Policy-Making. New York:
Routledge, 1996.
104
Taylor, Paul. The European Union in the 1990s. New York: Oxford University Press,
1996.
Thody, Philip. Europe since 1945. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Usher, John A. The State of the European Union: Structure, enlargement and
economic union. Essex: Pearson Education Press, 2000.
Weidenfeld, Werner (ed.). A New Ostpolitik – Strategies for a United Europe.
Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Publishers, 1997.
ARTICLES
Adam, Frane, Mitja Hafner and Samo Uhan. “Slovenia and the European Union:
Attitudes and Perceptions,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special
Edition, 2001.
Biro, Zoltan A. and Zoltan Rostas. “Images of Europe in Romania: The EU
Discourse,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe. Special Edition, 2001.
Cosgrove-Sacks, Carol. “The Economic Commission for Europe,” The Enlargement
of the European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau
and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), London: Routledge, 1999.
Engelbrekt, Kjell. “Multiple Asymmetries: The European Union’s Neo-Byzantine
Approach to Eastern Enlargement,” International Politics 39, March 2002.
Franco, Marc. “The enlargement: the European Commission's viewpoint,” The
Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies Victoria Curzon Price,
Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), London: Routledge, 1999.
Genov, Nikolai. “The Southeastern European Path Towards Globalisation: The Role
of the European Union,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe Special
Edition, 2001.
105
Henderson, Karen. "The Challenges of EU Eastward Enlargement," International
Politics 37. March 2000.
Hyde-Price, Adrian. “The new pattern of international relations,” The Enlargement
of the European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau
and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), London: Routledge, 1999.
Jovanovic, Miroslav N. “Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Sweet Lemon
or Sour Grapes?,” Brown Economic Review, Spring 1999.
Kirch, Aksel, Iris Brokling and Mart Kivimae, “Images of Europe - The Country
Study Estonia,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001
Komorowski, Stanislaw. "The Accession of Poland to the European Union,"
European Foreign Affairs Review 5, 2000.
Macfarlane, Neil. "The Regionalization of European Foreign and Security Policies,"
International Journal Winter 1998-99.
Motoc, Iulia. “Europe and its Teleology: Is there a Central-Eastern Vision?,”
Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 2000.
Mucha, Janusz and Marek S. Szczepanski. “Polish Society in the perspective of its
integration with the European Union,” East European Quarterly 35:4, January 2002.
Price, Victoria Curzon. “Re-integrating Europe: economic aspects,” The
Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price,
Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman (eds.), London: Routledge, 1999.
-------------------------------- and Alice Landau. “The Enlargement of the European
Union: dealing with complexity,” The Enlargement of the European Union: Issues
and Strategies, Victoria Curzon Price, Alice Landau and Richard G. Whitman (eds.),
London: Routledge, 1999.
Rovna, Lenka. “Images of Europe: the Czech Perspective,” Newsletter Social
Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001.
106
Sonyel, Salahi. "The European Union and the Cyprus Imbroglio," Perceptions 3:2
June-August 1998.
Tamas, Pal. “Selling Europe to the Enlargement Countries: the Hungarian
Approach,” Newsletter Social Science in Eastern Europe, Special Edition, 2001.
Verheugen, Günter. "The Enlargement of the European Union," European Foreign
Affairs Review 5, 2001.
OTHER SOURCES
(Briefing Paper(s), Research Paper(s), Report(s), Working Paper(s))
Andrews, Carole. “EU Enlargement: from Luxembourg to Helsinki and beyond”
International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, 14 June
2000, 00/62.
Balis, Christina V. (ed.). “Enlargement: A Priority for the European Union,” A CSIS
Europe Program Report, Washington (May 2001).
Baltas, Nicholas, C. “European Union Enlargement: An Historic Milestone in the
Process of European Integration,” The Fifty-First International Atlantic Economic
Conference, Athens, March 13-20, 2002.
Hillyard, Mick and Christopher Barclay. “EU Enlargement: The Financial
Consequences,” Research Paper 98/56, House of Commons Library, 1 May 1998.
Long, David. "The Why and How of EU Enlargement?," Working Paper 16, The
University of British Columbia, Institute of International Relations, July 1997.
"Enlargement of the European Union", (Annex 2), June 1997, by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office for general briefing purposes
http://files.fco.gov.uk/info/briefs/eu-enlargement.pdf
"Enlargement of the European Union" Focus International, London, April 1999
Foreign and commonwealth Office.
107
CIA Factbook 2001
Internet SOURCES
“Country Profile: Slovenia”, EuroFocus, Vol. 7 no. 4, June 19, 2001, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, http://www.csis.org/europe/eurofocus/v7n4.htm
“Country Focus: Poland”, EuroFocus, Vol. 8 no. 2, February 22, 2002, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, http://www.csis.org/europe/eurofocus/v8n2.htm
"Enlargement: A Priority for the European Union," EuroForum 3:3 (March 20,
2001), Newsletter - Europe, Program Center for Strategic and International Studies,
http://www.csis.org/europe/euroforur/v3n3.htm
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/extrel/enlarge.htm “European Union Enlargement:
Questions and Answers”
http://ipn.cec.eu.int/english/general-info/5-7-3.htm
http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/eu_info/utvidgning.forbered.asp
http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/low/english/special_report/1998/eu_enlargement/newsid
_61000/61672.stm
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50005.htm
“Preparations for membership”, January 16, 2002
http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/eu_info/utvidgning_forbered.asp
“Introduction to Expansion of the European Union: The Politics of Enlargement”
http://www.indiana.edu/~unionet/topics1-1.htm
108
REGULAR REPORTS
"2001 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1744.
"2001 Regular Report on Czech Republic's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1746.
"2001 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1748.
"2001 Regular Report on Latvia's Progress Towards Accession", by the Commission
of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1749.
"2001 Regular Report on Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001)
"2001 Regular Report on Estonia's progress towards Accession" by the Commission
of the European Communities, Brussels 13.11.2001, Sec (2001) 1747.
"2001 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession", by the Commission
of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1752.
"2001 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1753.
"2001 Regular Report on Slovakia's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1754.
"2001 Regular Report on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession", by the
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 13.11.2001, SEC (2001) 1755.
